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Abstract
Title: Keeping the Initiative through disruptions – Developing a Business Continuity
Model for Gambro
Authors: Axel Hyllienmark, Industrial Engineering and Management, Faculty of
Engineering, Lund University and Emil Nilsson, Industrial Engineering and
Management, Faculty of Engineering, Lund University
Supervisors: PhD Lina Karlsson, Director Project Office Global Operations, Gam-
bro and PhD Peter Berling, Assistant Professor, Department of Industrial Man-
agement and Logistics, Production Management, Faculty of Engineering, Lund
University
Background: Historically, the risk management activities in Gambro have been fo-
cused to ensure safety for patients and users of the company’s products where
Regulatory and legal demands have driven the development. Lately, the need
for a similar approach to assess and manage business risks has risen. When an
earthquake hit the company’s facilities in northern Italy in 2012, the company
did not have a predetermined plan for how to solve the crisis. Through good
management and a dedicated workforce, production was quickly recovered and
no patient harm occurred. After the experience the company realised the po-
tential benefits of proactive assessment and management of risks for business
interruptions.
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model for assessment of risks
that affects Gambro’s ability to deliver their products, i.e. operational dis-
ruption risks. The model should capture different types and levels of risks
and be applicable and easy to use throughout the company. The harmonised
model should enable Gambro to identify and mitigate risks in a structured and
analytical manner.
Method: A constructive research approach is used where a practical solution to
the proposed problem is suggested. Academic literature, benchmarking, and
Gambro’s current organisation is the basis for the development of a framework
and governance for business risk management.
Conclusions: A model for assessing disruption risks was developed. The model is
divided into two general areas: the organisation and the procedure. An organ-
isation with three different levels with different responsibilities of the process
was developed. The three step procedure consists of the methodologies and
tools required for identification of critical activities and resources, analyse and
quantification of risks in terms of likelihood and business interruption value,
and evaluate possible the risk responses.
Keywords: Risk Management, Business Continuity Planning, Business Continuity
Management, Risk, Disruptions, Interruption Value, Gambro
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Definitions
In this report, a number of important words and expressions are used. To
support the reader a list of definitions is presented below. The reader is
encouraged to go back to this list when necessary in order to fully understand
the context.
Buffer Time The time from the incident until Gambro’s business starts to be
affected. The time could be dependent of safety stock, backup systems
etc.
Business Recovery Time The time from the end of the buffer time to the
end of the downtime. During this time the business process will be
interrupted and no output delivered.
Business Interruption Value (BIV) The gross margin of the process’ fi-
nal output multiplied by the Business Recovery Time plus extra costs
such as idle capacity labour and equipment, inventory carrying, repair
costs etc. The value should also include loss of goodwill if possible.
Business Continuity Capability of the organization to continue delivery of
products or services at acceptable predefined levels following disruptive
incident.
Business Continuity Management The development of strategies, plans
and actions which provide protection for those activities or business
processes which, if they were to be interrupted, might otherwise bring
about a serious damage to the enterprise.
Business Continuity Plan Documented procedures that guide organiza-
tions to respond, recover, resume, and restore to a pre-defined level
of operation following disruption.
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Business Continuity Strategy Business Continuity Strategy is about us-
ing the findings in BIA and Risk Assessment to determine appropriate
actions to resume activities within agreed timeframes.
Business Impact Analysis Process of analyzing activities and the effect
that a disruption might have upon the company.
Business Recovery Time The time during which no output can be ex-
pected from the process in question. This time consists of two com-
ponents, the total down time minus the buffer time.
Continuity Project Team The Continuity Project Team is determined by
the Process Continuity Management Team in order to suit the particular
project. The team may include internal and/or external subject matter
experts.
Deductive Risk Identification An undesired scenario is imagined and pos-
sible causes are found and investigated (“what can cause this undesired
scenario”)
Detectability An estimate of the ability to identify a cause of failure before
the harm actually occurs.
Impact The expected magnitude of a risk’s impact. In the proposed model,
Business Interruption Value is used as a measurement.
Inductive Risk Identification All sub-steps of e.g. a process is gone through
and possible failure modes in each one are found and investigated (“what
can be the effect of this event occurring”)
Likelihood A term for measuring how expected an event is. Used inter-
changeably with probability and occurrence
Occurrence A term for measuring how expected an event is. Used inter-
changeably with probability and likelihood
Probability A term for measuring how expected an event is. Used inter-
changeably with occurrence and likelihood
Process Continuity Management Team The Process Continuity Manage-
ment Team includes, but is not limited to, Global Process Continuity
Manager, Local Operations Site, Local Supply, Site IT, Site Facility.
The team may include internal and/or external subject matter experts
xiii
Recovery Time Objective The Recovery Time Objective is the time that
is estimated can pass before Gambro’s ability to deliver to nearest cus-
tomer will be affected, and consequently negative business impact will
occur.
Risk Management The making of decisions regarding risks and their subse-
quent implementation, and flows from risk estimation and risk evaluation
(Society, 1992, p. 3)
Risk Mitigation The pro-active activities to deal with risks that are meant.
Risk Priority Number The Risk Priority Number is used in order to pri-
oritize between risks. It is found by calculating the geometrical repre-
sentation of the risks position in the risk matrix. This is done with the
formula
√
(L2 + S2).
Severity The expected magnitude of a risk’s impact. In the proposed model,
Business Interruption Value is used as a measurement.
QA/RA Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs.

Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of the Project
Businesses have been managing risks ever since the market economy started
to take shape hundreds of years ago. Balancing risk taking with preventive
actions is a large part of what it means to drive a business. However, as the
business environment grows more complex and supply chains are spanning
over more companies and longer geographical distances, the need for proper
risk management is as important as ever. This report proposes a model for
evaluating and managing this complex environment in which companies must
succeed in order to sustain a long term viable business.
Gambro, a leading medical device company, is one company for which risks
is a daily part of the business and requires constant monitoring. As a producer
of medical equipment, lives are dependent on Gambro being fully functional
in both the delivery capability and in the quality of the products. Histori-
cally, the focus of the risk management has lain in securing patient safety by
assessing and examining the products and its quality. Chemical production
processes and strict requirements for precision in the products’ operability
have made this an important task for Gambro. Legal requirements and su-
pervision from authorities has also driven the development. Lately, there has
also been an increased awareness of the risk of delivery capability and other
business risks. As is often the case, a specific event raised the question and
challenged the view of the current practices. In Gambro’s case, an earthquake
in northern Italy in 2012 left one major plant unusable and put strain on the
company’s global organisation to deliver the necessary products to ensure pa-
tient safety. While all treatments could be pursued through and after the crisis
the event had a financial impact on the company and highlighted the need for
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comprehensive and harmonised procedures for identifying and assessing the
risk for such disruptions. (Karlsson, 2013a)
1.2 Risk Terminology
The term risk is used in many circumstances and most people do not reflect
upon the formal definition, but generally the word means that future events
proceed in an unexpected way and cause disturbance to what is the intended
target. In daily life, the word can have a number of different meanings (Matt-
son, 2000, p. 33)
• A threat or danger (“There is a risk of flooding”).
• A probability (“Driving without seatbelt increases the risk of injury”).
• A combination of consequences’ likelihood and severity.
• A measurement of variability (“Insurance decreases the risk”).
More formalised, the triplet of risk scenario (what can happen), likelihood
of occurrence (how often will it happen) and severity of consequence (what
are the impacts) will always be present and constitutes the word risk in its
full sense.
Risk
Likelihood
How likely?
Severity
What is the 
impact?
Scenario
What can happen?
Figure 1.1: Components of the term risk
Other definitions of the word has also been proposed by numerous scholars,
for instance Harland, Brenchley, and Walker (Harland et al., 2003) proposes
the definition “[risk is] a chance of danger, damage, loss injury or any other
undesired consequences”, The Royal Society (Society, 1992) goes one step fur-
ther and define risk as “. . . the chance, in quantitative terms, of a defined
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Corporate function Scope of risk management
Senior management Competitors, political risks, legal risks
Procurement Suppliers’ financial situation, quality
Health and Safety Occupational hazards, dangerous materials
Operations Machine operability, quality of products
Research and Development Product safety, quality of products
Logistics Transportation issues, perishable stocks
Table 1.1: Examples of risks in different corporate functions
hazard occurring. It therefore combines a probabilistic measure of the occur-
rence of the primary event(s) with a measure of the consequences of that/those
event(s)”.
In this report, risk is looked upon as the interplay between the likelihood
of an event and the severity of its impact. Both categories are accompanied
with quantitative measures, as in the definition given by The Royal Society.
The risk scenarios are those that can affect Gambro’s ability to deliver and
thus poses a business risk to the company.
As mentioned, risk management is present in many parts of a company at
different levels. The work can be ongoing or done in project form. Examples
of functions and their scope of analysis are given in table 1.1
Scope of analysis and delimiters
Supply chain risk has received increasing attention the last decade. The view
on the supply chain as an integrated organisation with a common goal together
with increased requirements on logistical performance with Just-In-Time de-
liveries and other Lean principles have driven this development (Waters, 2011,
p. 10)
Manuj & Mentzer defines eight sub categories of supply chain risks in their
paper “Global Supply Chain Risk Management”. Several of the categories are
overlapping and risks sometimes fall into more than one category. (Manuj and
Mentzer, 2008)
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
No Type of risk Examples
1 Supply Risks Disruption of supply, inventory, schedules, and tech-
nology access; price escalation; quality issues; tech-
nology uncertainty; product complexity; frequency
of material design changes
2 Operational
Risks
Breakdown of operations; inadequate manufacturing
or processing capability; high levels of process vari-
ations; changes in technology; changes in operating
exposure
3 Demand Risks New product introductions; variations in demand
(fads, seasonality, and new product introductions by
competitors); chaos in the system (the Bullwhip Ef-
fect on demand distortion and amplification)
4 Security Risks Information systems security; infrastructure secu-
rity; freight breaches from terrorism, vandalism,
crime, and sabotage
5 Macro Risks Economic shifts in wage rates, interest rates, ex-
change rates, and prices
6 Policy Risks Actions of national governments like quota restric-
tions or sanctions
7 Competitive
Risks
Lack of history about competitor activities and
moves
8 Resource Risks Unanticipated resource requirements
Table 1.2: Risk categorisation, adapted from Manuj and Mentzer (2008)
As the risk for Gambro’s delivery capability is the main target of this
report, not all risk categories apply. Risk category 2, 4, 6 and 8 (operational,
security, policy and resource risks) are possible to cover to their full extent
by the proposed model. Risk category 1 (supply risks) is being analysed
quite roughly on a supplier/component level. Managing the risk of suppliers
is already one of the tasks for Gambro’s purchasing function, and the major
identified risks should be included in the same model as other risks for the sake
of managerial overview. However, different suppliers’ internal processes are
not looked into limiting the analysis upstream to the entry of components at
Gambro’s facilities. Downstream, the analysis is limited to the exit of finished
products from Gambro’s manufacturing unit’s stock. Further transportation
towards the customer is not considered in this report. Risk category 3, 5 and
7 (demand, macro and competitive risks) are not considered in this report as
they do not directly affect Gambro’s ability to deliver finished products.
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Goal
The goal of the thesis is to develop a risk analysis model that Gambro can use
for the assessment and analysis of risks for Gambro of not being able to deliver
their products. The model should be based on existing theoretical literature
as well as the existing practices within the company today. The model should
be easy to understand for the stakeholders, but also theoretically correct and
relevant. In addition the model should be quality assured by the authors
together with the intended future users and by fellow students not active in
the project. The goals are thus twofold:
1. Develop a theoretically correct model for risk analysis with Gambro’s
operations. The model should be relevant to the industry and structured
to use for all intended stakeholders.
2. The model should be tested by performing a complete risk analysis on
one or several of Gambro’s manufacturing units. Strong and weak points
should be evaluated in order to prepare for implementation of the model
throughout Gambro.
Outcome
The analysis will result in a model for assessing risks within Gambro Global
Operations. Theoretical and practical background will lay the foundation for
the model and will be motivated in an academic style report. The model will
be presented in the form of a manual or working document which can be used
unassisted by appropriate stakeholders. In addition the manual will be tested
on one or more of the production sites and an evaluation of the results will be
made.
Disposition
The report is divided as described in figure 1.2. Chapter 2 gives a background
to the thesis, introducing Gambro and explaining the events that highlighted
the need for risk management and initiated this thesis. Chapter 3 explains the
methodology used in this project. Chapter 4 summarises relevant academic
literature, which can be seen as a basis for the model proposed. Chapter 5
shows how risk management is used in practice, both within Gambro and in
other companies. In chapter 6 the developed model is proposed, using chapter
2, 4 and 5 as a basis. An test implementation of the model in Medolla, Italy
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1. Introduction
2. Background to the 
Project
3. Methodology
4. Theoretical 
Framework
5. Risk Management 
in Practice
6. Model
7. Test of Model
8. Conclusion
Figure 1.2: The chapters of this report
is described in chapter 7 and the report is summarised in chapter 8 with
discussions of the end result,
Chapter 2
Background to the Project
In this chapter, the case company Gambro is introduced. In particular, their
business area is described together with a historical background to this project,
the earthquake in northern Italy in 2012.
2.1 Gambro
History
Gambro was founded in 1964 on the basis of the invention of one of the world’s
first artificial kidneys, which had been developed by Professor Nils Alwall since
the mid 1940’s. At a social event he met industrialist Holger Crafoord who
was then active in the packaging industry, but felt compelled to develop and
market the new and potentially life saving technology. In 1967 the company’s
first product was launched and since then Gambro has been one of the world
leading companies in its sector. (Gårdlund, 1989, p. 207)
Business areas
Gambro is a global leader in kidney and liver dialysis, Myeloma Kidney Ther-
apy and other extracorporeal therapies for chronic and acute patients. The
product range includes different types of complete systems for hemodialysis,
complete systems for multiple blood purification therapies and systems for
water purification in hospital environments. A large part of the sales is made
up of disposable products and consumable chemical substances for one time
use. (Gambro, 2013)
The company has approximately 7500 employees and 13 manufacturing
sites in 9 countries. The manufacturing units operate in 4 different areas.
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The Monitor products are monitor equipment for dialysis and other machines
such as water purification systems. The Dialyzer business area produces the
disposable filter used for blood and fluid purification. The Solution business
area makes the chemical substances used in the different purification processes
and their packaging. The Bloodline business area produces catheters, cassettes
and other products for vascular access. The machines are standardised in their
basic setup but can be modified with different types of filters, catheters and
needles to suit the exact need of individual customers. An excerpt of Gambro’s
products is displayed in figure 2.1 (Gambro, 2013)
Figure 2.1: An excerpt of Gambro’s products, from left to right: Artis (Mon-
itor), Polyflux (Dialyser) and Artiset (Bloodlines)
Global organisation
The corporate headquarters is located in Lund, Sweden in connection to man-
ufacturing units in the business areas Machines and Solutions. The main
production sites and their locations are:
• Monitors
– Lund, Sweden
– Crevalcore, Italy
• Solutions
– Lund, Sweden
– Sondalo, Italy
– Daytona, USA
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– Yongin, South Korea
• Dialyzers
– Hechingen, Germany
– Opelika, USA
– Meyzieu, France
• Bloodlines
– Poggio Rusco, Italy
– Prerov, Czech Republic
– Tijuana, Mexico
– Shanghai, China
Besides those main factories there is also a small unit for liver therapies
in Rostock, Germany. The plants in Crevalcore and Poggio Rusco are tempo-
rary arrangements after the earthquakes in Medolla, May 2012. A reinstated
facility in Medolla is under development and will take over their function.
Research and development is performed in the Lund HQ as well as at the
different sites. Altogether, Gambro’s products are offered in more than 100
countries. (Karlsson, 2013b)
Dialysis – Gambro’s main business
In the case of kidney failure, there are three main types of treatment possible,
namely:
• Kidney transplantation
• Paritoneal dialysis
• Hemodialysis
A kidney transplantation means that a new kidney from an organ donator
is placed into the patient. Paritoneal dialysis is a treatment form where the
lining of the belly is used to filter the blood inside the patient’s body. The only
treatment that Gambro is currently involved in is Hemodialysis, where a ma-
chine is used to filter and clean the blood outside of the patients body.(National
Kidney and Urologic Deseases Information Clearinghouse, 2010)
In hemodialysis, blood is first pumped out of the body through a catheter
and into the dialyser which is connected to the machine. The arterial blood
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pressure and the inflow pressure is monitored at all times. In the dialyser, the
blood is filtered through semi-permeable materials and purified with chemical
substances. The clean blood can then be pumped back into the body in a
controlled manner. The entire process is schematically illustrated in figure
2.2.
Figure 2.2: Dialysis process
Gambro’s solutions are packaged in highly sterile bags or cylinder shaped
containers. The demands on the products and packaging require production
processes in very sterile environment and exact specifications on all ingoing
materials.
2.2 Medolla Earthquake
In May 2012 an event occurred that changed Gambro’s view on risks. In
Medolla, north of Italy there were two consecutive earthquakes with respec-
tive aftershocks. In Medolla, Gambro had a large monitor and bloodlines
production site. The earthquakes were measuring up to 5.8 on the Richter
scale, and left personal injuries, with 27 people dead and over 14,000 people
without homes, as well as substantial monetary and physical damages (Pov-
oledo, 2013a). Furthermore, the earthquake had major impacts on the Italian
economy affecting an area that contributes to over 1 percent of Italy’s gross
margin product, among them the Gambro plant. (Povoledo, 2013b)
For Gambro, the earthquake resulted in two destroyed production lines,
disrupting all deliveries and prohibiting access to finished goods. Clearly,
the event also had a large impact on all employees and their personal lives.
The top priority for Gambro was the continuity of patient care and ensuring
that the customers had everything they needed to treat their patients. As a
response, a steering committee with senior management members and experts
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from all functional areas was formed to manage the recovery. The following
measures were taken immediately: (Gambro, 2013)
• Production of spare parts started in a new plant in Crevalcore, Italy
and the Artis and Phoenix monitor production was resumed within 3
months.
• A new automated warehouse in Varese, Italy was instated.
• A new temporary plant in Poggio Rusco, Italy was started to restore the
bloodlines production.
• New offices were opened in Modena, Italy, where R&D and other support
functions were reinstated.
• Gambro was looking into various options to assure that the customers
had access to the products they needed to treat their patients, in coopo-
ration the regulatory authorities.
• There were thorough investigations of the status of the customers’ stocks,
inventory and weekly consumption in order to prioritise deliveries.
• Employees and extra resources were working double shifts in order to
ensure deliveries according to plan.
These cautions together with a global effort, e.g. increased production of
Artis cassettes in Tijuana, Mexico, made sure that appropriate deliveries were
completed and consequently that the patients safety were ensured. (Karlsson,
2013a)
The catastrophe highlighted the importance of appropriate evaluation of
risks and preparation of adequate responses. On beforehand, the risk of an
earthquake was seen as very low and the area struck was not even listed as a
vulnerable region by the Italian Geophysics Institute. (Povoledo, 2013a)

Chapter 3
Methodology
In this chapter, the research approach is described and motivated and the
projects main steps are outlined. A description of the literature studies con-
ducted in the beginning of the project is also included.
3.1 Approach
In order to describe and validate the choices a researcher makes, it is important
to have a clear and well defined methodology to support the research process.
The approach should fit both the intended question of the research, as well as
the different stakeholders of the project.
The aim of the project, as described in the chapter 1, is to, with a practi-
cal mindset harmonize and develop the assessment procedures for disruption
risks within the organisation. The background material will be made up by
academic literature on the subject, as well as qualitative, empirical data from
interviews and existing documentation both from within and outside of the
company. The research can also be considered to be normative, thus giving a
result and conclusion based on gathered information.
One method that could be used for projects of this practical nature is the
constructive research approach, as proposed by Kasanen and Lukka (1993)
The approach is built around a procedure for producing new and innovative
constructs to real-world problems, and by that make a contribution to the
theoretical field in which it is applied. In addition, the solution should have a
clear connection to existing theory in the field and, of course have a practical
functionality. The construct can take shape in many forms, such as diagrams,
models, organisational structures, plans and commercial products.
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According to Kasanen and Lukka (1993), the constructive approach should
fulfil six requirements based on its core features:
• Focus on real world problems felt relevant to be solved in practice.
• Produce an innovative construction meant to solve the initial real-world
problem.
• Include an attempt for implementing the developed construction and
thereby a test for its practical applicability.
• Imply a very close involvement and co-operation between the researcher
and practitioners in a team-like manner, in which experimental learning
in expected to take place.
• Explicitly link to prior theoretical knowledge.
• Pay particular attention to reflecting the empirical findings back to the-
ory.
The approach is based in the belief that thorough analysis of what works
(and what does not) can make significant contribution to theory. The model
has many resemblances to common practice of consultancy projects. However
it has a stronger foundation in theory prior to the solution making phase and
also includes a reflection of the theoretical contributions in the end phase of
the project.
Practical 
relevance of the 
problem and 
solution
Connection to 
prior theory
Practical 
functioning of the 
solution
Theoretical 
contribution of 
the study
CONSTRUCTION
(Solution to the 
problem)
Figure 3.1: The constructive approach suggested by Kasanen and Lukka
(1993)
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3.2 Procedure
The approach is divided into seven distinct steps, each presented below with
additional comments on the theoretical background and the execution in this
specific project. The following steps are adapted from Kasanen and Lukka
(1993):
Step 1. Find a practically relevant problem, which also has
potential for theoretical contribution
Comment: The first step is clearly one of the most important in any research
project, as it will define a large part of the following work. The topic should
ideally both be of practical relevance and not sufficiently analysed in existing
academic literature.
Execution: This step has mainly been addressed by the target firm and
the academic institution prior to the start of the project by defining the prob-
lem scope (Gambro) and accepting it as applicable as a master thesis sub-
ject (LTH). The special legal requirements present in the pharmaceutical and
medical device sector is another aspect that makes the research novel and the
solution unique to the certain case.
Step 2. Examine the potential for long-term research co-operation
with the target organisation
Comment: As the problem is of practical nature it is of importance that co-
operation between the external researchers and the target firm is functional
and does not inhibit the project process.
Execution: By working from office spaces at the company in direct prox-
imity to relevant personnel, support and aid from the top management as
well as having access to the organisation’s intranet, the level of commitment
is considered to be well sufficient. Direct contact at least weekly with Lina
Karlsson, the project supervisor, also plays a major role in keeping the connec-
tion tight between the project activities and the ultimate research objective.
She is also likely to undertake a managerial role of the continued use of the
proposed model and will thus act as a future practitioner.
Step 3. Obtain deep understanding of the topic area both
practically and theoretically
Comment: This step contains of applying the common methods of information
search such as analysis of existing literature, analysis of company internal
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documents, interviews and observations. Deeper knowledge of the subject
from a theoretical point of view should be obtained, primarily by studying
existing literature. The researchers should also in this step get a thorough
understanding of the circumstances of the particular case setting.
Execution: A literature search is done by scanning article databases for
relevant scientific articles. Books and book chapters are also consulted in
the theoretical search. This process is further discussed under the Literature
review section. In order to understand the case at the company all plant
managers are asked to provide any documents previously prepared within
the area of risk management and contingency planning. Interviews are also
conducted with key personnel at various departments in Lund in order to
understand how the processes are currently set up and which concerns that
have to be addressed. A benchmarking through interviews with two case
companies and the author of one case article is also conducted. The interview
objects are chosen due to their expertise and knowledge, together with the
project supervisor.
Step 4. Innovate a solution idea and develop a problem solving
construction, which also has potential for theoretical contribution
Comment: This phase is, for obvious reasons, critical to the ultimate success
of the project. Because of the innovative nature of the step, there is little
theoretical advice given in the literature but an iterative process with input
from both the researchers and the practitioners intended to use the model is
usually needed.
Execution: A standard model for risk management, suitable for all in-
tended company units is developed based on the previous steps. The model
both includes a background of how and why it is designed in a certain way,
and instructional documentation for use in the risk assessment processes.
Step 5. Implement the solution and test how it works
Comment: This phase makes the constructive approach differ from many other
analytical approaches in that the theoretical design is actually implemented
and tested in real life to confirm its applicability. A true belief in the model,
both by the researchers and the company practitioners, is a prerequisite for a
successful implementation and valid results.
Execution: The model is after the initial development tested and validated
in the reconstruction project of the monitor and bloodlines production facility
in Medolla, Italy. The test is conducted with the project manager of the
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reconstruction as a highly active participant together with managers from the
different business areas.
Step 6. Ponder the scope of applicability of the solution
Comment: Once implemented, the researcher should take a step back from the
empirical work and evaluate the outcome of the project together with the case
organisation. The applicability and critical success factors should be discussed
if the outcome is regarded as a success and the possible contributing factors
could be analysed if the project has failed in any way.
Execution: As the project goal is to develop a procedure which could be
used throughout the company it is very important to document the steps
necessary to take for a successful implementation. The test of the model is
also used as a base for finding improvement points and success factors before
a wider roll-out is started.
Step 7. Identify and analyse the theoretical contribution
Comment: As in the previous step, in the very end of the project, the re-
searchers should distance themselves from the previous work and analyse it
from an objective point of view. Typically, two main types of potential contri-
butions can be found in projects conducted with a constructive approach. The
first potential contribution is the novel construction itself as theory is applied
to an unknown area. The second possible contribution is the processes and
structures that have emerged in the case. Positive relationships between those
features and the outcome should be considered and documented if contribution
to theory.
Execution: The primary objective of the project is to address the issues
raised by the company and to develop a model that works in that particular
setting. However, the theoretical knowledge that may be obtained during the
different phases is documented, both for the benefit of the organisation and
possibly of other project report readers as well.
3.3 Literature Review
When conducting the literature review within the frame of this report a num-
ber of different academic areas have been investigated. LibHub, Lund Uni-
versity’s search engine has primarily been used to find articles from academic
journals. Risk analysis, risk management, supply chain risk management and
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hazard identification are examples of the key words that have been used. Of-
ten times, the reference list of one article has led to findings of other sources.
Printed material such as books and article collections have been found us-
ing the search engine at the internet based bookstore Amazon.com. Also
used, but to a lesser extent, have been the commercial internet search engine
Google, primarily to find white papers prepared by consultancy firms such as
Accenture, BCG and IBM.
Chapter 4
Theoretical Framework
In this chapter, relevant academic literature is summarised. This is one of
three types of input which has been used in this report, the others being
practical use of risk analysis and Gambro’s organisational structure.
The theory is furthermore composed by three different levels, resulting in
equally many sections in this chapter.
The chapter first discusses risk management in a supply chain perspec-
tive, under the name Supply Chain Risk Management. The main focus lies
in flexibility, visibility and redundancy, whose importance are highlighted and
clarified through case descriptions. In the following section, managerial as-
pects are discussed, focusing on the two well established managerial processes
within the area: Risk Management and Business Continuity Management.
Their similarities and differences are studied as well as what their main ap-
plication areas are. In the last section of the chapter four commonly used
methods for Risk Identification and Evaluation are presented. The models
can be used in both the Risk Management and Business Continuity Manage-
ment frameworks.
4.1 Supply Chain Risk Management
Risk management in the supply chain has relatively recently emerged as a
recognised field of research in the academic world. The purpose of the re-
search has been to develop methods for understanding and managing risk
that appears in an organisation’s entire supply chain. (Khan and Zsidisin,
2012, p. 9)
As company’s supply chains have become more and more global at the
same time as Lean strategies have pushed down inventory levels, the risk level
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in supply of raw material and components have in general become higher.
There is also evidence that imply that the social, political and economic de-
velopments over the last decade have increased the likelihood of disruptions
in complex supply chains. (Khan and Zsidisin, 2012, p. 9)
The development in purchasing strategies is another aspect that has put
supply chain risk management higher on the agenda. Especially single sourcing
of strategic components and materials is an obvious source of risk which can
have severe impact on the buying company’s result if a disruption occurs.
Most of the literature in this field is based upon cases of successful or
failed attempts of managing supply chain risk of different kinds. Some relevant
examples of those cases are briefly presented in order to provide a background
to readers and also inspire Gambro to critically analyse its supply chain.
Ericsson’s disrupted supply of radio frequency chips
On March 18th 2000, thunderstorms over New Mexico caused electrical power
fluctuations throughout the state. At a small Philips production facility, the
disturbances caused some cooling fans to stop and a small fire broke out in one
of the facility’s clean rooms. The fire was put out even before the fire depart-
ment arrived 10 minutes later. Philips notified its two customers, Nokia and
Ericsson, about the fire and warned that the incident might cause problems
in the deliveries of radio-frequency chips for which the production process in
the clean room was vital. Promises were also made that the production would
soon be re-established and that there was no need for worry. Nevertheless, af-
ter 6 months the production was still at only 50 % and new equipment would
take even more time to produce and install. For Ericsson, the impact was
huge. The Philips plant was the only supplier of the chip needed for one of
its most important consumer products. Consequently they would not be able
to answer to the strong demand during the short market window which char-
acterises the mobile phone industry. Later, the business interruption costs
calculated to approximately $ 200M were covered by insurance companies.
The insurance payment was one of the biggest in 2001, exceeded only by the
9/11 attacks. (Norrman and Jansson, 2004)
Even though the chip was equally important to Nokia, they avoided the
financial impact to a much larger extent due to superior management of the in-
cident. The difference was in the response to the information given by Philips
on the day of the fire. Nokia immediately started searching for alternative
suppliers and secured availability of the vital component. Ericsson, on the
other hand, waited for additional information from Philips without contact-
ing other companies. Once the magnitude of the problem was realised, Nokia
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had already tied up the global supply of chips and Ericsson was very limited
in its possible strategies. (Norrman and Jansson, 2004)
The case illustrates how much impact a seemingly small incident at an up-
stream supplier can have when the downstream customer becomes too heavily
reliant. It also exemplifies the need for adequate action on information once it
is available. No one can foresee and avoid all events, but it is of strategic im-
portance to have plans ready for execution when a potentially harmful event
occurs.
Visibility
On way of reducing certain risk levels is to increase the so called supply chain
visibility. Typically, this means that information sharing is increased and
partners let one another in on their flow of data and information. Typical
types of information can be stock levels, demands, seasonality, new product
launches, unexpected events, lost sales etc. Traditionally, correct delivery size,
time and quality have been enough and little information was needed to be
passed on. However, having a functioning information flow between partners
can be vital when disturbances occur. If information about risks is not passed
on, the downstream partners will not be able to act adequately to respond
and the supply chain performance is susceptible to risk that otherwise could
have been avoided.
In the case of Ericsson and Nokia, Philips did share information about the
fire as soon as it happened. Even though the information was not accurate
in terms of when operations would be back to normal, there is no evidence
that Philips was untruthful in their estimations. The problem was rather
that Ericsson did not have the correct structures in place for acting on the
information. This turns us onto the next strategy for avoiding supply chain
risk. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 10)
Flexibility
Flexibility is one of many buzz words in supply chain management which can
be difficult to grasp and translate into concrete actions. When speaking of
sourcing, the term can relate to a number of different techniques and strategies
in the supplier management. In general it can be describes as an aligned
strategy in how many suppliers a company has for a specific component and
how the relationship with the supplier(s) is managed. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 215)
For single sourcing strategies a deeper relationship is clearly necessary than
if many suppliers are used for the same component or material. For strategic
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and engineered components deeper relationship is also of importance to shape
prosperous and long term commitments. Simply put, the interface between
number of suppliers and the relationship strategy can be explained with figure
4.1 (Sheffi, 2003, p. 215)
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Figure 4.1: Procurement alignment (Sheffi, 2003, p. 215)
The theory and strategies behind those ideas can be described into much
more detail than what is possible in the scope of this project; instead one
illustrative business case is presented to clarify the concepts and benefits of
flexibility.
On the morning of February 1, 1997, Toyota’s sole source of P-valves (a
small component used in the break system) Aisin Seiki Co. saw their factory
go up in flames following some sparks from a broken drill. The P-valves cost
around $ 8-14 per piece but all of Toyotas models were dependent upon them.
Toyota was at the time expecting a surge in demand on the Japanease market
and was already running 115 % of normal production rate. Being a just-
in-time manufacturer, Toyota only had a few days stock of the P-valves in
stock and on the road towards their factory. On February 4th, 20 out of 30
production lines had to be shut down due to the lack of P-valves, and it would
still be months until Aisin would be back to normal production levels. (Sheffi,
2003, p. 211)
But the response was already in action. The afternoon of the 1st, Toyota
and Aisin had gathered potential P-valve manufacturers in a conference room
where engineers divided blue prints and valve making assignments. The sup-
pliers were found among Toyota’s and Aisin’s regular supplier base as well as
some independent companies found in the companies’ extended manufactur-
ing network. A total of 65 suppliers replied to the request and started making
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replacements, among them the huge automotive parts manufacturer Denso.
Since the P-valves required high precision tapered holes and surfaces, Aisin
continued to act as quality controllants, in the supply chain of the P-valves.
(Sheffi, 2003, p. 211)
The initial effort did not include financial or legal negotiations; the sup-
pliers trusted Toyota and simply went to work as quickly as possible. The car
giant’s market position and long history probably acted as clear motivators
for the suppliers to perform on their top.
On February 7th, all Toyota plants had started with a single shift and on
the 10th, 9 days after the fire, the production volume was at 13-14 000 out of
the planned 15 500 cars per day. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 215)
The case illustrates what can be achieved in terms of flexibility when a
there is a deep relationship between the supplier and the customer as well as
other companies close in geography and business. Nokia demonstrated the
same type of capabilities as Toyota when finding alternate suppliers of the
radio frequency chips, but in their case the need for supplier collaboration
was not as strong, as the component had less need for specific engineering
skills than Toyota’s P-valves.
Redundancy
At the same time as lean strategies, just-in-time deliveries and continuous
improvement programs often times aims at lowering stock levels and removing
unused resources, there has also been a tendency towards building redundancy
where it is needed. Most of the time, this redundancy is unused and only acts
as a cost driver, companies see it as a necessary evil because the potential cost
of a disruption is so high.
The parcel carrier FedEx delivers millions of packages in the US. Many of
those packages are transported by plane, especially when the value is high and
the transportation time needs to be minimised. The cost for a customer of
an undelivered package can potentially be very high. If FedEx has to ground
planes and the packages cannot be moved to another carrier, the company is
very vulnerable of loosing business due to dissatisfied customers. To reduce
the risk of this happening, FedEx each night dispatches two planes, one from
each coast of the US, completely empty. The planes fly to Memphis and
then returns, again empty. The logic behind this is that if a plane with very
important goods is grounded, one of the empty ones can be rerouted and take
care of the delivery. Several other planes are also sent half-empty every day
for the same reason. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 176)
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Other companies use different methods for building resilience. Boston Sci-
entific manufactures advanced medical devices and drug coated stents used
from keeping arteries open on heart surgery patients. The regulation around
the devices is comprehensive and apart from FDA approval, each batch of
product must be completely traceable and accompanied with a 40 page doc-
ument to ensure the quality. After assessing their risk environment, the com-
pany realised that in the case of a disruption for whatever reason the time to
get new lines in place and approved would be extensive. Such an event could
potentially endanger the future of the entire company. To mitigate the risk,
the company has built redundant production lines for some of their products,
got them FDA approves and trained personnel in operating them. While
this extra capacity is not inexpensive, the company decided it to be worth
protecting itself the risk. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 175)
Other companies has spare IT capacity ready to take over important infor-
mation systems in case of accidents. Such a solution came in use for Deutsche
Bank when the September 11 attack in New York lay much of its facilities
in ruin. Data flows were moved to servers in Ireland and the company could
continue it operations. (Sheffi, 2003, p. 177)
The point of those cases is that when a disaster hits, redundant capacity
might be the only way to deal effectively with the consequences. If the redun-
dant capacity is controlled, well managed and not used as a measure against
weak processes, it can be strategically correct to take the extra cost as a sort
of insurance instead of accepting the risk. Companies have to assess where
their greatest vulnerabilities lies and invest accordingly. Extra IT capacity is
for instance generally not extremely expensive and may provide a necessary
alternative if the normal routes of information are disrupted.
4.2 Organisational Culture
The previous section discussed the requirements for an effective supply chain
risk management policy and some of its complexities. In the same way as
TQM (Total Quality Management) needs to be implemented in the organisa-
tion in order to work, risk awareness needs to be a part of the company culture
(Christopher and Peck, 2004, p. 50). As earlier mentioned, there are a lot of
motivators for moving up risk management on the agenda, concerning every-
one and not only a risk management team. But as with every case of culture
change, there are some critical success factors that divide the successful ones
from the less successful. Three of the most essential follow below:
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Support from top management
One key success factor for effective risk management practices is sufficient
support from the top management. Similar to TQM, risk management has
required the top management to set the context within the company and pass
their views down to the rest of the organisation. With that in mind together
with the development of risk management, the assessments of risks are getting
increasingly important for companies, and take up more and more of the top
management’s time. (Waters, 2011, p. 80) (Christopher and Peck, 2004, p.
50)
Waters states that risk management is of such holistic nature, that it
needs to be initiated and followed up by the top management. It is not only
suggested that it is the best solution, but also that it is a requirement in order
to be successful. Furthermore he summarises a list of requirements that the
board of directors should at the very least do: (Waters, 2011, p. 80)
• Define the organisation’s attitude towards risk, its philosophy and the
strategic direction of risk management
• Create an appropriate environment for risk management, with necessary
systems and resources
• Publish risk management policies defining attitudes, approaches and
responsibilities
• Know about significant risks that the organisation faces
• Understand the potential consequences of these risks for stakeholders
• Ensure that appropriate processes are in place for identifying, analysing
and dealing with risks, and that these work effectively
• Communicate with stakeholders to ensure that everyone is aware of their
responsibilities for risk management
• Know how the organisation will manage a crisis
• Assess the performance of risk management
Furthermore, the annual Global Risk Management Study 2011 done by
the consultancy firm Accenture, suggests establishing a dedicated corporate-
level risk executive with complete oversight and visibility across the business
as a critical success factor that distinguish top risk performers from lower.
(Accenture, 2011)
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Phase Activities
Plan (Establish) Establishing policies for the further risk work.
Objectives, targets, processes and procedures
are examples of things that need to be deter-
mined and aligned to the organisation’s objec-
tives.
Do (Implement and operate) Implementing the planned activities from the
previous phase.
Check (Monitor and review) Monitoring and reviewing the performance of
the risk precautions. Reporting results to the
management for feedback. Determining and
authorising further adjustments and improve-
ments to be done.
Act (Maintain and improve) Correcting the proposed improvements in the
previous step. Re-evaluating the scope of the
system’s policy and objectives.
Table 4.1: Plan Do Check Act cycle in a risk management perspective (Inter-
national Standard Organisation, 2012)
Cross-Functional Governance
Another point that most literature agrees on is the importance of cross-
functional risk management teams. Waters (2011) and Christopher and Peck
(2004) all argue that a cross-functional team needs to be implemented in or-
der to get a complete overview and monitor the functions of the company in
a good manner. The Accenture study (Accenture, 2011) goes beyond that
and states that organisational silos are actually preventing organisations to
mitigate risks in an effective manner.
Continuous Process
Literature of Risk Management and Business Continuity Management sug-
gests that the risk management process needs to be continuous and changed
to fit the prevailing conditions in order to be effective and efficient. It can in
other words never be seen as finished. (Waters, 2011, p. 97) (International
Standard Organisation, 2009, 2013)
This is ensured by clear responsibilities and a cyclical process. ISO stan-
dards as well as Waters suggest implementing a well recognised cyclical ap-
proach called the PDCA-cycle (Plan Do Check Act). The cycle, described in
4.1, is adapted from ISO 22301:
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4.3 Managerial Risk Processes
In research, there are two well-recognised high-level processes that stand out
within the area of risk, namely Risk Management and Business Continuity
Management. The different processes’ activities are quite similar and overlap
to a high degree. Their respective definitions are widely debated. Some prac-
titioners argue that BCM is a part of RM while others argue the opposite. A
third group even argue that they are completely distinct processes.(Chadist,
2012, p. 23). However, the consensus seem to be that Risk Management is
focusing on the risks that are known and can be mitigated in some proactive
way, whereas BCM is primarily focusing on reducing the risk consequences,
regardless of the cause (that might be unknown beforehand). (Waters, 2011,
p. 233)
Risk Management has been addressed by the International Standards Or-
ganisation (ISO) in their extensive document ISO 31000, first published in
2009. Business Continuity Management has even more recently gotten sim-
ilar attention with the guiding document ISO 22301 published in 2012 and
the more detailed version on the same subject ISO 22313 published in 2013.
Below follows a description of the ISO’s two approaches, also supported by
other academic sources.
Risk Management
The Royal Society defines Risk Management as “the making of decisions re-
garding risks and their subsequent implementation, and flows from risk esti-
mation and risk evaluation” (Society, 1992, p. 3). The Risk Management
process is about understanding risks within an organisation, and minimising
their impact by either reducing their likelihood or severity.
ISO 31000 includes the following steps in Risk Management (International
Standard Organisation, 2009):
• Establishing the context
• Risk Assessment
– Risk Identification
– Risk Analysis
– Risk Evaluation
• Risk Treatment
• Monitoring and Review
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Step 1 - Establishing the context
The initial step of a Risk Management process is about determining how
the rest of the steps are to be done. Furthermore it involves defining goals,
responsibilities, methodologies, measurements and limitations of the process.
One important activity is defining risk criterions, e.g. severity and likelihood
ratings, which must reflect the organisation’s values, objectives and resources.
Step 2 - Risk Assessment
Risk assessment are the activities that systematically identify, analyse and
evaluatee the risk consequences and causes for disrupting the organisation’s
prioritised activities or resources. Simpler put, it is about finding risk causes,
evaluate them in terms of likelihood and severity, and propose a suggestion of
how to possibly face them.
Step 2a - Risk Identification
There is an abundance of risk identification methods, usually developed with
different industries and production processes in mind. As risks can appear
in an endless variety and no deterministic information of the likelihood and
severity exists beforehand, there is no perfect identification method that fits
all situations. Working in a structured manner will support and stimulate the
identification, and reduce the chance of missing critical risks to the organisa-
tion (Waters, 2011, p. 122). In contrast, if the identification is left to informal
arrangements, there is a high chance that they are found on a too high or low
level, either trying to find the most trivial risks, or missing important risks
that could have severe consequences. It is not always clear what level of detail
that should be, literature naturally suggests that it differs from organisation
to organisation, and the level should be adapted to the complexity and po-
tential consequences of the organisation and its activities. In the end it comes
down to management judgement (Waters, 2011, p. 105) .
One way to stimulate the identification phase is to sort risks into different
categories and then assess the different categories with some type of tool. One
example of such a categorisation, done by Manuj and Mentzer, was described
in the introduction of this report (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Some typical
risk identification and evaluation tools are Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis and Hazard and Operability Studies, which will
be further elaborated on later in this chapter. The tools are furthermore typ-
ically divided into two main categories; deductive and inductive approaches.
With deductive thinking an undesired scenario is imagined and possible causes
4.3. MANAGERIAL RISK PROCESSES 29
are found and investigated (“what can cause this undesired scenario”). With
inductive thinking, all sub-steps of a process is gone through and possible
failure modes in each one are found and investigated (“what can be the effect
of this event occurring”).
When trying to identify risks of larger magnitude, an unstructured brain-
storming approach may be more effective than specific frameworks. However,
using tools such as a map of the site, process maps and component lists can
help the brainstorming. (Kelly, 2013)
Step 2b - Risk Analysis
In order to prioritise the risk responses, if they are to be reduced in some way
or deemed acceptable, an evaluation needs to be done. As mentioned before,
the term risk consists of likelihood and severity, apart from a description of
what is happening. As a consequence, this step consists of assigning risks from
the risk identification with quantitative measurements in terms of likelihood
and severity.
Step 2c - Risk Evaluation
This step is a quite natural consecutive step where the risk analysis’ outcomes
are evaluated. The evaluation is primarily focusing whether the risks are
accepted or any action should be implemented, depending on the level of
acceptability that was set in the first process step (establishing the context).
In addition the evaluation involves setting priorities of the risks, determin-
ing what risks are more important to treat than others.
Step 3 - Risk Mitigation or Risk Treatment
By the term risk mitigation it is the pro-active activities to deal with risks
that are meant. There are of course many approaches for dealing with risks,
if not endlessly many. However some basic principles can be generally be seen
and elements from accept, share, transfer, reduce and avoid risks will most
certainty be included. (Norrman and Jansson, 2004)
• Risk acceptance could for instance mean neglecting risks consequences
that are very small.
• Risk sharing could be contracts that are shaped to let more than one
stakeholder bear the consequences if the risk was to happen.
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• Risk transferring is letting another organisation take over the whole risk.
Insurance is an example of this strategy.
• Risk reductions are the strategies that reduce risks, either in terms of
occurrence or severity. An example of an occurrence reduction would be
using a fireproof material decreasing the likelihood of a fire. An example
of reduction of severity is implementing sprinklers to decrease the fire’s
impact.
• Risk avoidance are the strategies that eliminate the risk source com-
pletely. For instance if there is some process connected to a risk which
could be eliminated or changed to an alternative one, the risk would be
avoided.
There is no systematic way to determine what response to prefer since the
environment differs greatly between organisations and from situation to situ-
ation. However it quite naturally involves balancing benefits with drawbacks,
where factors to consider are financial costs, time of implementation and the
result of mitigation strategy in terms of organisational goals. Risk sharing
and transfer may in fact not be mitigating the risk from a supply chain per-
spective. The focal company may nevertheless decrease their potential risk
impact by those strategies. It can therefore be an effective incentive to make
supply chain partners implement actual risk treatments themselves.
Norrman and Jansson (2004) exemplify this decision in their article about
Ericsson’s pro-active work, as seen in figure 4.2. Ericsson quite simply compare
cost of a preventive action to the business value that also is measured in
financial terms.
Step 4 - Monitoring and review
As discussed, the Risk Management Process needs a feedback loop in order
to be relevant for an organisation. The aim is to ensure that the procedures
and strategies are maintained continually. This can involve periodic and ad
hoc reviews, with different benefits. Although the reviews should be done
continually, they are particular important when introducing new products,
processes, equipment, facilities, sites, suppliers, trading partners or any other
significant change. (Waters, 2011, p. 229)
Business Continuity Management
All significant risks are not known, even if identifying them is the aim of a
Risk Management system. Many times, organisations are hit by risks which
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Figure 4.2: Cost of preventive actions versus the business interruption value
(Norrman and Jansson, 2004)
were inherently unknown prior to the event. This problem is the main idea
behind Business Continuity Management, which is not based on an analysis
of identified risks. Instead BCM looks for ways of dealing with disruptions
regardless of how they occur. For instance an organisation might consider the
failure of an IT-server and what to do to get operations going, regardless of
how the server failed. The term Business Continuity Management is defined,
by the distinguished researchers Hiles and Barnes, as:
"The development of strategies, plans and actions which provide protection
or alternative modes of operation for those activities or business processes
which, if they were to be interrupted, might otherwise bring about a seriously
damaging or potentially fatal loss to the enterprise" (Hiles, 2010)
Business Continuity Management involves the following activities (Inter-
national Standard Organisation, 2012):
• Business Impact Analysis
– Identify Critical Activities and Resources
– Determine the Recovery Time Objective for resuming the activities
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• Risk Assessment
– Identify risk of disruption.
– Systematically analyse risk
– Identify what risks that require treatments and what kind of treat-
ment
• Business Continuity Strategy
– Establish Business Continuity Plans for stabilising, continuing, re-
suming and recovering the prioritised activities
– Mitigating and responding to and managing impacts
• Protection and Mitigation
– Reduce likelihood of disruptions
– Reduce the severity of disruptions
• Exercise and Monitoring
– Review & Update
– Incident handling
– Training
The different activities in a Business Continuity Management system will
be elaborated on below. Some of the activities are almost identical to those
in the Risk Management process, and will not be discussed in detail.
Step 1 - Business Impact Analysis
As one of the main ideas with BCM is focusing on the critical activities and
resources opposed to all, the Business Impact Analysis (BIA) should be seen
as the foundation on which a comprehensive BCM is based on. By focused
efforts, the further assessments are considering the activities and resources
the business really depends on and is disregarding the others. This will let
the organisation focus on what is important and will give a better end result
(Khan and Zsidisin, 2012, p. 192). The critical activities and resources are
defined as those that cannot be re-established or recovered in an easy manner.
Each activity or resource is also assigned a related recovery time objective
(RTO), meaning how long the organisation can accept the activity or resource
to be unavailable without suffering significant loss.
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A pre-requisite for finding the critical activities and resources is deep
knowledge of the organisation and its business model. By understanding what
actually creates value within the organisation, critical points, resources and
activities can be found. The identification step is preferably done in a system-
atic manner by using for instance process maps, but can also be made in more
unguided ways. Resource maps, including human, capital and IT resources are
also valuable assets for indicating vulnerabilities and central points of failure
for an organisation. (Basu et al., 2008)
The Recovery Time Objective is determined by appropriate individuals
and describes a target time in which a function must be operational following
a disruption, to avoid suffering financial impact (Blos et al., 2010). When
determining RTO it is of course very tempting to set it very low; that the
timeframe of recovering or re-establishing activities and resources is in a very
short time. But as the measurements should aid the further assessments it
should be set reasonable and be reachable by some strategy or plan.
To summarise, a Business Impact Analysis should provide the following
according to ISO 22313 regarding Business Continuity Management systems:
• Obtain an understanding of the organization’s key products and services
and the activities that deliver them
• Identify the key resources likely to be required for continuity and recov-
ery
• Identify dependencies (both internal and external)
• Determine priorities and recovery time objectives
Step 2 - Risk Assessment - Risk Identification, Analysis and
Evaluation
The Risk Assessment in BCM is very similar to the assessment done in the
Risk Management process. The main difference is that the BCM focuses on
the risks that are specified in the Business Impact Analysis without going to
detail of specific causes. Therefore the classifications in terms of likelihood and
severity are not given the same weight in Business Continuity Management as
in Risk Management.
Step 3 - Risk Mitigation
ISO 22313 suggests that even if Business Continuity Management primarily
focuses on the risks consequences, it is usually appropriate to investigate the
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cause and if the risk can be reduced pro-actively in some way. This step is
very similar, if not identical, to the Risk Mitigation step in Risk Management.
Step 4 - Business Continuity Strategy
Business Continuity Strategy is about using the findings in BIA and Risk As-
sessment to determine appropriate actions to resume activities within agreed
timeframes.
ISO 22313 suggests that the following may be alternatives for such strate-
gies (International Standard Organisation, 2013):
• Activity relocation – Is it possible to transfer activities internally or
externally?
• Resource relocation or reallocation – Transfer resources to another loca-
tion, internally or externally.
• Alternate processes and spare capacity – Establish alternate processes
or create redundancy capacity in processes and/or inventory.
• Resource and skills replacement – Enhancing people capabilities or cre-
ate access to additional people capability through outsourcing.
• Temporary workaround – Adopt a different way of working which pro-
vides acceptable results for a limited time.
The chosen strategies need also to take into account any risk mitigation
or treatment that is already in place within the organisation.
Step 5 - Establish and implement business continuity plans
This step is about arranging for appropriate responses to a disruption, re-
sulting in a Business Continuity Plan. Furthermore it includes establishing
appropriate internal and external communication protocols, e.g. alarming the
stakeholders as well as determining responsible individuals and teams.
The Business Continuity Plan should at the least include the following
information (International Standard Organisation, 2013):
• Purpose and scope
• Objectives and measures of success in terms of prioritised activities
• Activation criteria and procedures
4.3. MANAGERIAL RISK PROCESSES 35
• Implementation procedures
• Roles, responsibilities, and authorities
• Communication requirements and procedures
• Internal and external interdependencies and interactions
• Resource requirements
• Information flow and documentation processes
The telecom company Ericsson has divided the continuity planning into
three phases (Norrman and Jansson, 2004):
1. Response plan: the required reaction to an incident or emergency to
assess the level of containment and to control activity.
2. Recovery plan: the recovery phase actions shall include the actions that
are needed to resume critical or essential business operations, functions
or processes.
3. Restoration plan: the process of planning for and implementing full-
scale business operations again and to allow the organization to return
to normal service level.
Step 6 - Exercising and Testing
The business continuity procedures of an organisation must in addition to
establishing Business Continuity Plans, actually try them out in order to be
reliable. For that reason proper exercise routines must be implemented and
regularly maintained. They should also be monitored and reviewed with the
same arguments that were discussed in the Risk Management section.
Challenges with Risk Assessment
The risk assessment phase, which is included in both RM and BCM, naturally
involves some challenges due to the subjectivity of finding and measuring risks.
The challenges of identifying, measuring and classifying the risks are discussed
in the following section.
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Problems with Risk Identification
When discussing risk identification, it immediately becomes clear that it is
a very hard task. For instance, a small disruption at one location can have
a large effect for an organisation at another location, similar to the famous
butterfly effect where it is said that a butterfly’s wings could cause a ripple
effect resulting in a storm.
Donald Waters proposes the following four main categories of difficulties
with risk identification and its dynamic nature: (Waters, 2011, p. 124)
• Inherently unknowable risks
• Time-dependent risks
• Progress-dependent risks
• Response-dependent or secondary risks
Inherently unknowable risks are the risks that are simply not known to
exist, completely hidden and then emerge completely unexpected. As there
is no evidence of such risks, there is no real possibility to reduce them. The
best chances of dealing with such risks is to have an implemented Business
Continuity Management system. (Waters, 2011, p. 123)
Time-dependent risks are the risks that only emerge with the passing of
time and are not yet visible. Government policies are for instance first visible
and presented when they are formalised and adjusted, and cannot be known
beforehand. (Waters, 2011, p. 124)
Progress-dependent risks are those that only appear when some progress
at the organisation has occurred. For instance, if the organisation decided to
reduce redundancy and therefore cut inventory costs, e.g. lower the inventory
levels, the risk of stockouts may increase and consequently the ability to deliver
will be reduced. (Waters, 2011, p. 124)
Response-dependent or secondary risks are the consequences that occur
after an action is taken in response to an identified risk. Another warehouse
example is if a risk of stockout occurs, and increasing the inventory levels
mitigates the problem. With that change the risk of having too high stock
levels is introduced instead, and as a response to an existing identified risk.
(Waters, 2011, p. 124)
Measuring risks
A risk analysis can be done in a quantitative manner by simply evaluating
the risks in terms of likelihood/probability and severity and multiplying them.
4.4. METHODS FOR RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS 37
This would give an expected value of a risk event. For instance, if the likelihood
is said to be 10 % chance on a yearly basis and the severity is 30 000 eif that
risk is to occur, the expected value of a risk event would be 0.1 x 30 000 =
3000 e. However, it is clear that 90 % of the years no risk event will occur
(cost of 0 e), 10 % of the years something will happen (cost of 30 000 e), but
never will the cost be 3000 e.
This example is pointing out one large difficulty with risk assessment; that
risks only can have a severe effect when and if they actually happen. This
together with the often quite subjective estimations of severity and likelihood
consequently mean that an expected value is something imaginary that should
rather be used to prioritise risks than an estimation of costs. To aid the
prioritisation, it is possible to put them in different spectrums that suggests
different attention, either they are so small that they can be safely neglected
or large that it really needs to be reduced or prepared for.
Risk classifications
A measurement of risks requires some classifications of risk levels to be de-
termined. Company size and risk acceptance level can determine the severity
classification whereas the types of risks to be analysed normally influences the
likelihood classification. It is often a good idea to choose a measurement that
clarifies how often an event actually happens, e.g. years between every oc-
currence. For more frequent events, with reliable historical data, more exact
probability factors can be used instead.
For severity ratings, it is essential to choose a measurement that is aligned
with the purpose of the risk analysis. For example, Gambro extensively use
product risk and quality analysis in order to ensure patient safety. In that
case it is natural to use patient harm as severity, e.g. factors such as result in
death and results in temporary injury (Gambro AB, 2011). For a risk method
with the purpose of analysing operational or disruptive risks, i.e. an event
that may disrupt deliveries, a value-related measurement can be used. In that
way, decisions are more apparent and most parts of the organisation will be
able to relate to that specific risk. (Norrman and Jansson, 2004)
4.4 Methods for Risk Identification and Analysis
Neither Risk Management nor Business Continuity state explicitly how the
Risk Assessment, e.g. Risk Identification, Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation,
should be done. In practice, there are several techniques and approaches with
their respective advantages and disadvantages. This chapter will describe four
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System Component Failure
mode
Local effect System effect Suggested
actions
Bicycle Left pedal Break off at
pedal arm
Impossible to
use with foot
Only right pedal
can be used to
power bicycle
Shorten
service
intervals
Table 4.2: Example of FMEA table
of the most typical approaches for an operative risk assessment, namely Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard and Operability Study
and Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points.
The methods are comprehensive and involve a number of predetermined
steps. They can be put in contrast to more intuitive methods, such as brain-
storming and what-if analysis.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
One of the most classical and commonly used frameworks for working with
and assessing risks is the so called FMEA, short for Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis. The method was originally developed by the US airline and space
industry in the 1950’s and has been in regularly use since the 1980’s by Swedish
manufacturing firms.
There are two main application areas of FMEA, product and process.
Both use the same type of methodology and give a similar output. However,
one focuses on how certain product functions can decrease the total product
functionality. The other focuses on how parts of the production process can
cause the product’s total functionality to decrease. (Bergman and Klefsjö,
1995, p. 135)
Methodology
The theory of FMEA is simple, the system is analysed component by compo-
nent and possible failure modes are found. For each failure mode, there is a
corresponding effect on a local and global system level. The analysis can also
include recommended changes to the system in order to improve the system
with regard to each identified failure mode.
In the example presented in table 4.2, a bicycle is assessed using a FMEA
framework. A failure mode is found at the left pedal, leading to a local and
system effect. A suggested action is proposed to mitigate the risk proactively.
Realistically, more failure modes are probably found, the example is strictly
illustrative.
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Quantification of certain parameters is often done in an extended version of
FMEA, called FMECA, Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis. Each
failure mode’s Occurrence (probability of incidence), Severity (harmfulness of
effect). These parameters are rated on a predefined scale, 5 or 10 steps are
sometimes found in the literature. Each rating (e.g. Frequent) should be char-
acterised of well-defined prerequisites, for instance an interval of probabilities.
(Bergman and Klefsjö, 1995, p. 138)
High High MediumSerious
High High MediumSerious
High Serious LowMedium
Serious Medium LowMedium
Medium Medium LowMedium
Catastrophic (1) Critical (2) Serious (3) Negligble (4)
Frequent (A)
Probable (B)
Occasional (C)
Remote (D)
Improbable (E)
Severity
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
Figure 4.3: A risk assessment matrix, adapted from Department of Defense -
Standard Practice (2012, p. 12)
It is also possible to add the third dimension Detection (probability of
detection before effect occurs) to the analysis making it three instead of two-
dimensional. In this case, the three ratings are usually combined into a Risk
Priority Number, RPN. This is most commonly calculated by multiplying all
three ratings.(Bergman and Klefsjö, 1995, p. 138)
The work flow in a typical product FMEA/FMECA could include the
following steps (Bergman and Klefsjö, 1995, p. 138):
1. Definition and limitation of the system
2. Choice of level of detail
3. Review of the system’s functions
4. Review of the components functions
5. Identification of possible failure modes and their consequences
6. Assessment of failure likelihood
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7. Possibilities of failure detection and localisation
8. Assessment of failure severities
9. Analysis of failure dependencies
10. Presentation
Benefits and drawbacks of FMEA
The main benefits of FMEA include: (Gould et al., 2000)
• It gives an understanding of the construction, by following the conse-
quences of failure modes up to system level.
• The summary should give a decision base for alternative construction
solutions.
• It points out components which are critical to system functionality.
• Testing and error search is simplified with a FMEA background.
Major drawbacks are: (Gould et al., 2000)
• No concern is taken to the dependencies of individual failure modes for
the system effect.
• A complete FMEA can be time consuming and may require many ex-
perts to perform.
FMEA is one of the methods extensively used at Gambro for patient risk
on a product and process level.
Fault Tree Analysis
Another widely used method is the fault tree analysis, or FTA. The first
implementation was done 1962 by Bell Telephone Laboratories to analyse
the risks when developing rocket launch pads. The model was then further
developed by the American space industry and its first commercial use was in
1966 by Boeing. The model is still used extensively as an analysis tool within
the field of reliability. (Bergman and Klefsjö, 1995, p. 139) (Bergman and
Klefsjö, 1996, p. 431)
The main difference between FTA and FMEA is that the later is an in-
ductive method wheras the former is a deductive method (Bertsche, 2008).
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This ultimately means that FMEA examines the effects of a failure whereas
FTA traces the reasons of an undesired scenario, from the top event down
to its causes. The main benefit with this is the increased understanding of
the system as a whole and how the failures are connected. Shortly, the main
objectives of a fault tree analysis can be described as: (Bertsche, 2008)
• A systematic identification of failures and how they are related
• Illustration of critical event combinations
• To gain objective evaluation criteria of system concepts
• Provide a clear documentation of the failure mechanisms and their func-
tional relations
Representations
The fault tree itself is a graphic model of the combinations of faults that will
result in the predefined undesired event. Logical gates are used in the con-
struction of a fault tree. The gates are represented by standardised symbols,
as defined in figure 4.4.
Basic event
Failure or error in system component or element 
(example: switch stuck in open position)
Initiating event
An external event (example: bird strike to aircraft)
OR gate
The output occurs if any input occurs
AND gate
The output occurs if all the inputs occur
Figure 4.4: The standardised symbols of fault tree analysis
Methodology
The construction of a fault tree is initiated by specifying the undesired top
event, e.g. a specific machine breaks down. During the next step the reasons
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for that undesired event are identified, breaking it down to a lower and lower
level with logical gates, either OR- or AND gates. (Bergman and Klefsjö,
1995, p. 140)
In order to illustrate a FTA, consider another example with a bicycle.
The top event is loss of breaking power. The bicycle is equipped with two
independent break systems, one hand break on the front wheel and one hub
break on the rear wheel engaged by pedalling backwards.
Loss of breaking 
function
AND
Chain Failure Hub Failure
OR
Break Wire 
Failure
Break Pads 
Worn Out
OR
Rear Break Failure Front Break 
Failure
OR
Human Error
Figure 4.5: A bicycle example of fault tree analysis
In order for the bicycle to lose its breaking ability, the two breaks have
to be compromised independently. The front break can fail in two different
ways, each one enough to make it stop working. The case is similar for the
rear break with both possible failure modes enough to make it stop work.
Qualitative and quantitative use of a Fault Tree Analysis
A fault tree analysis is by definition a qualitative assessment, as experts opin-
ions are used to connect causes to potential effects (Stamatelatos et al., 2002).
However, a quantification of the model can be made by evaluating the proba-
bility of each sub event from bottom up and an aggregated probability of the
event can be determined.
This practice should only be considered when sufficient amount of his-
torical data is present and given the often subjective nature of probability
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assessments, the result should be looked upon as a guidance and basis for
prioritisation rather than a certain forecast of the future.
Benefits and drawbacks of FTA
The main benefits of FTA include: (Gould et al., 2000)
• Increased understanding of the system’s structure and design.
• Possibility to find weak spots and critical failure modes also without
component data.
The main drawbacks are: (Gould et al., 2000)
• As the procedure should be done in small steps in order to find appro-
priate level of detail, the work can be time consuming.
• Complex systems can lead to large trees which are difficult to compre-
hend.
Hazard and Operability Study
The HAZOP method, short for Hazard and Operability Study, is another
qualitative technique developed by engineers working for Imperial Chemical
Industries during the 1970’s. The purpose of the method is to identify hazards
in processes by a systematic team effort. It was developed as a response to
the qualitative traditional methods that mostly investigated more obvious
hazards, not being able to see the unexpected and sometimes more severe
hazards.
HAZOP is an inductive method and an underlying assumption of the
method is that a problem can only arise when a deviation occurs. Therefore
unexpected events in the production process, and their cause, are to be inves-
tigated. The focus of the analysis is normally to find expected or foreseeable
deviations to the process’ intended operations, for instance higher pressure in
a certain pipe than what it is designed for. Another important aspect of the
model is the team-based approach, where a distinct leader performs the study
together with a chosen team, using flow charts of the plant. (Rossing et al.,
2010)
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Methodology
HAZOP is performed as a brainstorming activity, going through a production
process or plant part by part. A cross-functional team with engineers from
different departments is normally gathered for the task.
In the brainstorming, guidewords are introduced. Typically examples of
such guidewords are no/not/none, more, less, part of, reverse, other than,
as well as. These are used to stimulate imaginative thinking in the brain-
storming process and are combined with parameters, such as temperature or
pressure. This combination, e.g. more pressure, is investigated by answering
the following questions: (Rossing et al., 2010)
• What could be a cause of increased pressure?
• What is the consequence?
• What can be done as a safeguard?
• What is our recommendation to mitigate the risk of increased pressure?
The answers are well documented in a template. It is a thorough system-
atic approach that has shown to be very intuitive in some industries.
Benefits and drawbacks of HAZOP
The main benefits of HAZOP include: (Gould et al., 2000)
• Systematic and comprehensive technique that takes a holistic view of
the plant.
• Examines the consequences, as opposed to only the causes, of a failure.
The main drawbacks are: (Gould et al., 2000)
• Is originally designed for use in chemical or process industries, the ap-
plicability of guidewords can therefore be low in other areas.
• Time consuming and complicated.
• Requires experienced practitioners.
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HACCP
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points origins from the food and bever-
age industry and was developed by a supplier of space food for the US space
program in the early 1970s. The method was implemented to provide the
lowest risk possible for letting contaminated food reach the consumer. The
method is based around the core concept of finding critical control points
for examination of a product for deviations in predetermined risk categories.
(Hulebak and Schlosser, 2002)
Mehodology
A HACCP is started by considering all possible hazards which may be applied
to the specific product. For instance, the food and chemical industries always
include the hazard of foreign pathogens in their analysis. The second step is
to identify where such hazards can appear in the production process and also
find points in which measurements can be done and deviations found. This
step is often done with the help of process maps and flow charts. Thereafter
acceptance levels for all measurements and procedures for the control should
be established.
The methodology is best suited for continuous process flows and mainly
addresses risks which are quite easily thought of and may cause the end prod-
uct to not be fully functional in some sense. (Hulebak and Schlosser, 2002)
Benefits and drawbacks of HACCP
The benefits of HACCP include:
• Very suitable for food and chemical product risks.
• Focuses on risk prevention.
• Increases process awareness.
Some drawbacks are:
• Only considers foreseeable risks.
• Limited applicability to industries with non-continuous flows.

Chapter 5
Risk management in practice
This chapter discusses how risk management can be used in real situations.
The chapter is started with cases of three different companies’ risk manage-
ment approaches, Tetra Pak, Alfa Laval and Ericsson. The cases are used
as inspiration and is coloured by the individuals that were interviewed and
is consequently not a complete overview of the companies’ risk management
approaches. The chapter continues to describe Gambro’s approach to product
risks, which can be used as learning and inspiration for the model proposed
in this thesis. The chapter is finished by a summary of Gambro’s approaches
to disruption risks from the different sites.
5.1 Cases
Tetra Pak
Tetra Pak is a global company specialised in processing and packaging for the
food and beverage industry. The company is based in Lund and has around
20 000 employees operating in more than 150 countries. (Tetra Pak, 2013)
Tetra Pak’s and Gambro’s history coincide through Gambro’s founder Hol-
ger Crafoord who, earlier in his career was one of the most important individ-
uals in the build up of Åkerlund & Rausing and the subsequent foundation of
Tetra Pak. (Gårdlund, 1989, p. 207)
The company has business in several different areas. Packaging Solutions
delivers different kinds of processed packaging material, ranging from ready
made packages to large rolls of material which need further processing at the
customer. Processing Solutions delivers systems and machinery for filling of
food and beverages at the customer’s premises. (Tetra Pak, 2013)
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Tetra Pak’s operations span over a wide range of domains with many
different types of operations, suppliers and customers. This makes their risk
environment heterogeneous and also dependent on legal issues, given the need
for food safety. (Grönwall, 2013)
An interview was held with Tetra Pak’s vice president of Supplier Man-
agement, Jan Grönvall. The interview primarily concerned risk management
of the supplier base, but also Tetra Pak’s overall risk management practices
were discussed.
Tetra Pak has three overall methods for identifying and assessing risks.
The first, bottom-up approach is conventional but systematic. Every manager
is asked once a year, where they can identify risks in their respective area of
work. The risks are collected and assessed in terms of probability and impact
by a group of more senior management. Impact is assessed on a scale of 0-
1000 including sales, costs, reputation, people and compliance. Probability is
assessed in the groups A-F where A is expected to happen every 100 years and
F happens all the time. The risks are also classified into one of 13 families, for
instance, market, fire and legal risks. The quantitative risk assessment is done
by the company’s full time risk officer who has knowledge about earthquake
vulnerability, fire hazards and similar areas where historical data can be used
to determine the risk level. (Grönwall, 2013)
The risks and their families are then mapped into a matrix for improved
visualisation. The appropriate decisions makers can then take the risks into
account and decide whether the risk should be accepted or lowered via the
probability or the impact side. (Grönwall, 2013)
On the supply side, every account manager makes a risk assessment of
his/her supplier. Normally, this is only done on tier one suppliers, but in the
case of strategically important partners it is sometimes done also further up
in the chain. A concrete example of activity is to send fire experts to make
an evaluation of the protection at the supplier. When a new supplier is about
to be accepted, there is an assessment based on 11 standard risks. Exam-
ples of those are IP-risks, CSR-risks, political risks and export regulations.
(Grönwall, 2013)
Tetra Pak does not demand that the suppliers notify about incidents and
near misses. According to Jan Grönvall this might make the suppliers less
open and prone to holding on to information instead of the intended target.
The third type of risk assessment is an evaluation of the insolvency risk
of the suppliers done 6 times per year. All key account managers answer 13
“common sense” questions aimed at finding suppliers who might be in financial
trouble. Some examples of the questions are:
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• Have there been any negative newspaper articles about the supplier?
• Has the supplier discarded employees lately?
• Are other companies in the same sector facing problems?
• Have there been late deliveries?
• Has the supplier asked for early payment?
• Has the supplier been more difficult to negotiate with?
The questions are answered by the responsible purchasing manager and
issues are discussed in the bimonthly meeting where also representatives from
the legal, financial and supply chain department are present. The routine
started after the 2008 financial crisis when Tetra Pak faced problems due to
supplier bankruptcies and has continued since then. (Grönwall, 2013)
Alfa Laval
Alfa Laval is a global manufacturer in the areas of heat transfer, separation
and fluid handling based in Lund. The company delivers to over 100 countries
and has approximately 16 000 employees worldwide. (Alfa Laval, 2012)
The first products manufactured by Alfa Laval were produced in the late
1800s. The manufacturing site in Lund is mainly focused on plate heat ex-
changers and employs approximately 2000 persons.
An interview was held with Håkan Nilsson, General Manager of the Com-
ponent Unit at the Lund production site. Håkan is deeply involved in the use
of Business Continuity Planning of the production processes in Lund but also
worldwide. The focus of the interview was therefore in this area.
Alfa Laval’s focus in risk management lies in their so called Business Con-
tinuity Planning. The rationale behind the focus is to ensure the continuity of
profitable activities, as opposed to viewing the work as a cost cutting activity.
(Nilsson, 2013)
The work is initialised when a decision is made to investigate a certain area
of the operations. Critical processes are identified by going through templates
of questions with machine costs, what they are producing and whether the
processes can be re-established someplace else. This identification process
is performed by a steering group made up of representatives from the IT,
production and facility department. (Nilsson, 2013)
Once the critical processes have been identified an area specific team is
formed. This team is constituted by competent employees such as the line
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manager and other experts. Those will identify the weakest links in the pro-
cess. IT-support or certain machine parts are examples of what can be iden-
tified. FMEA is the primary methodology used in this process. Once the
weakest links are identified, it is possible to make plans over what should be
done in the case of a breakdown or an emergency. (Nilsson, 2013)
The re-use of already performed Business Continuity Plans is extensive.
When an assessment of a similar area to what has already been made, the
old one can be used as a blueprint and only necessary adjustments have to be
made. The BCPs are re-evaluated and updated every six months. (Nilsson,
2013)
The processes are valued in their contribution to monetary profit for Alfa
Laval, this makes them simple to prioritise and also gives the project weight
when presented to top-level management. (Nilsson, 2013)
Ericsson
Following the disruptive fire described in chapter 4, Ericsson took a new ap-
proach as to how supply chain risks were to be viewed and worked with in the
company. A description of the company and its model for managing supply
chain risk is used as a benchmark in the preparation of the model. No inter-
view has been done with employees at Ericsson, but a thorough description of
the process is provided by Norrman and Jansson in their article “Ericsson’s
proactive supply chain risk management approach after a serious sub-supplier
accident”. An interview with the academic co-author of the article, professor
Andreas Norrman was also held. (Norrman, 2013)
Ericsson is a global provider of equipment for telecommunications and
services to operators of fixed and mobile networks. In 2012 the company had
approximately 110 000 employees worldwide and sales of over 33 billion USD.
(Ericsson AB, 2012)
Organisation
The supply chain risk management is organised into two main levels. It is
led by the corporate function Risk Management who is responsible for all risk
management activities in the Ericsson group, including contact with insurance
companies and setting directives. Within the supply function, a risk manager
is responsible for developing and coordinating all the work. A matrix organi-
sation with the Supply Chain Risk Manager, members from different business
areas (products) and corporate functions (production, logistics, etc) is respon-
sible for tasks such as:
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• Maintaining an optimal level of risk exposure and costs versus protection
activities (Supply Chain Risk Manager)
• Securing the reliability of supply chains to deliver (Supply Chain Man-
agers)
• Supporting SCM with risk issues (production)
The SCRM is working closely with both the corporate risk management
and with the matrix organisation’s “line people”. (Norrman and Jansson,
2004)
Step 1 - Identification of critical components and suppliers
The first step of Ericsson’s risk management approach is the identification of
critical components and suppliers. Components are analysed one by one and
classified. The component is put into one of four classes with the specifications:
1. The component is currently sourced from more than one approved sup-
plier (different manufacturers or different sites of the same manufac-
turer).
2. The component is currently sourced from one approved supplier, but
others are ready and available.
3. The component is currently sourced from one approved supplier, others
are available but not approved.
4. The component is currently sourced from one supplier, others are not
available.
The second step of the analysis of each component is to try and assess
the business recovery time, meaning how long time an accident would affect
deliveries. The components are put into one of four classes:
1. It takes less than three months to get deliveries from an alternate source.
2. Three to eight months to get approval and deliveries from an alternative
source.
3. 9 to 12 months, re-design the only alternative.
4. 12 months, re-design of a unit/product of high complexity.
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Step 2 - Risk Assessment process
Once the classification is done, the suppliers and sub-suppliers of critical com-
ponents are assessed using the own developed Ericsson Risk Management Eval-
uation Tool (ERMET). Risks in different categories are identified and possible
sources are found and analysed by cross functional groups in a manner similar
to Fault Tree Analysis. Some categories of risks are:
• Business Control
– Management systems
– RM organisation
– Audits & Inspections
– Financial structure
• Natural hazards in the surrounding
– Earthquakes
– Blizzards
– Landslides
– Hurricanes
• Man-made hazards in the surrounding
– Dams
– Pollution
– Sever building collapses, fires
– Transportation incidents
• Hazards at the site
– Materials
– Property protection
– Production processes
– Key persons
– IT-systems
• Business interruption handling
– Crisis organisation
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– Mitigation measures
– Contingency plans
Ericsson thereafter tries to evaluate the risks in terms of severity and
probability in a risk matrix, however, they have found that the probability
measure is often difficult to find and focuses more on the financial impact when
prioritising between risks. The financial impact is assessed by multiplying
the gross margin of the product and the business recovery time and adding
extra cost such as idle capacity, inventory carrying and loss of goodwill. The
combined value is called Business Interruption Value. The risks are classified
into one of four classes in terms of BIV:
1. Severe: > $100 million
2. Major: $50-$100 million
3. Minor: $10-$50 million
4. Negligible < $10 million
These severity classifications span from around 0.05% to 0.5% of the com-
pany’s turnover in 2004. (Ericsson AB, 2012)
The third part of the risk management process is to find and decide upon
risk mitigation strategies. This is responsibility of supply chain managers for
risks concerning suppliers and the production managers for internal risks. The
process is supported with templates where risk description, causes, strategies
and their costs are presented. The ratio between the costs of preventive actions
and the BIV is regarded as very important in this stage.
Ericsson has also added a step of risk monitoring, meaning continues
follow-ups of unmitigated or very high risks. Suppliers and other supply chain
partners are monitored as to how they fulfill their commitments.
Step 3 - Business Continuity Plans
The last part of a risk management process is the incident handling and busi-
ness continuity plans. The information flow in the case of an incident at an
external or internal supplier is formalised and emergency response teams are
available in the case of an accident. For the cases where the impacts cannot
be minimised on beforehand, continuity plans are developed in accordance to
a predetermined format. The plan is divided into a response (immediate),
recovery (medium term) and restoration (long term) phase with instructions
of what should be done and who is responsible for the result.
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Benchmark summary
In order to use the benchmarking in the best possible way, the similarities and
differences between the companies’ practices are distinguished and presented
below:
• A cross functional approach to business risk management is common
for all benchmarked companies. Different departments are active when
identifying and analysing the risks.
• All companies update and re-assess their risks periodically to keep the
information up to date.
• Financial value is used as a measurement of severity at Ericsson and
Alfa Laval. The companies have found it an effective measurement for
communication and prioritisation.
• Risk mitigation is put on high impact risks at Ericsson and Alfa Laval,
as likelihood is considered difficult to assess effectively.
• Tetra Pak and Ericsson divide their risks into classification of likelihood
and severity to simplify the communication.
• Ericsson differs in the sense that the approach takes a wider look on
the supply chain, by to a larger extent considering both suppliers and
sub-suppliers in their model.
5.2 Product risks
Given Gambro’s business of medical devices, the company is used to strict
demands on the evaluation of risks concerning the safety of patients. Due
to the importance, there are several regulatory requirements from instances
as the US Food and Drug Authorities (FDA) and European Union (EU).
Until the mid 1980’s, the requirements for medical devices were not as high
as they are today, but after a couple of disreputable incidents, the importance
of regulatory requirements was highlighted and the demands were increased.
(Barkman, 2013)
In order to comply with these regulatory demands, Gambro has introduced
a corporate function responsible for the risk management through the entire
product life cycle. The function, called Product Risk, coordinates and per-
forms assessments and mitigations of the risks that may affect patient safety.
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The working procedures for Product Risk are described in Gambro’s qual-
ity management system through standards operating procedures and working
instructions, made in accordance to the existing requirements concerning med-
ical technology, e.g. ISO 14971 (Application of risk management to medical
devices). All risk assessments, regardless of product stage, are done by cross
functional teams, combining for instance individuals from the departments
product risk, medical, R&D and sometimes systems analysts and HFE (Hu-
man Factor Engineering).
The product life cycle can in Gambro be divided into four major phases
the, R&D, design, production and post-production phases. The Product Risk
department’s focus lies in the three last phases.
Research & 
Development
Design Phase Production Phase
Product Risk Management
Post Production 
Phase
Product Process
Figure 5.1: The product risk work in the different product life cycle phases
First, the product development is initiated by a R&D process where the
rough guidelines of a new product are drawn up. In this quite fuzzy and
unguided phase no structured risk management is conducted.
During the product’s design phase around 80 % of the Product Risk de-
partment’s activities are conducted. Investigations are made of what potential
harms could occur from a specific design, and how they could be prevented.
This is typically done deductively by an approach not much different from a
Fault Tree Analysis. The approach is effective as the exact design and list of
components is not yet decided upon making an inductive methodology diffi-
cult. The process is supported by design phase documentation from similar
products and the work is done in collaboration with the different compo-
nents. In the design phase, there is a considerable weigh towards qualitative
approaches, not measuring severity and probability to a high degree.
During the production phase inductive approaches, such as FMEA are
used. Hazard and Operabilty studies (HAZOP) and Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Point studies (HACCP) are other methodologies sometimes
applied. This phase is generally done more quantitatively than the design
phase, and sometimes include a third measurement of risk detectability in
addition to probability and severity. (Barkman, 2013)
For the Product Risk department, probability is defined as the qualitative
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and/or quantitative estimate of the probability that the patient will suffer
harm, per treatment. The probability classification is done according to a 5
step scale (ranging from frequent to improbable), each with specific percentile
ranges (Gambro AB, 2013). Regulatory demands require that a report is filed
every time a patient is harmed by the treatment, which makes that data more
available to use as probability instead of equipment failure. (Barkman, 2013)
Severity is measured as the impact of a potential hazard and the five clas-
sifications are ranging from catastrophic (resulting in death) to negligible (in-
convenience, no injury) (Gambro AB, 2013). The classification is determined
by the medical expertise included in the cross functional team.
The third measurement of detectability is an estimate of the ability to
identify a cause of failure before the product or customer is affected. The
scale is ranging from none/very low (There are no detection methods in place.
Impossible or extremely difficult to detect or the methods are unproven or very
unreliable) to certain (Detection methods are extremely effective, reliable, and
validated with statistical significance). (Gambro AB, 2013)
After the phase of classifying the risks they are evaluated and divided into
one of three classes. They are deemed as either acceptable, unacceptable or
ALARP (as low as reasonable practicable). (Gambro AB, 2011)
• If the risk is seen as unacceptable it must be mitigated to either accept-
able or ALARP.
• If the risk is seen as ALARP, the risk is considered as acceptable only if
no further mitigations are technically or economically practical and that
the medical benefits of the intended use outweigh the residual risks.
• If the risk is considered acceptable, no further justification of risk control
measures is required.
Given the strict requirements on carrying out risk management activities,
thorough documentation is done to ensure visibility to authorities and other
stakeholders. This is also considered valuable in order to transfer knowledge
from one risk assessment to another. (Barkman, 2013)
5.3 Gambro’s Approach to Business Risks
Prior to the initialisation of this project, there has not been a coherent and
harmonised process for the identification and assessment of disruptive busi-
ness risks in Gambro. Despite this, individual plants and business units have
certainly addressed the issues and carried out activities closely related to what
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is the intention of this project. The level of detail and scope of analysis differ
between the different plants, but provide a good basis of where the greatest
issues lie and how the analysis may be performed. Material from a number
of Gambro’s site was acquired at an early stage of the project by requesting
information from all sites within Gambro. The purpose of the request was to
get an overview of the analysis’s that have been done in the last years. Three
distinct types of risk analysis’s can be identified from the acquired material. It
is important to note that the acquired material may not represent all activities
the sites have performed in relation to analysis of disruption risks.
• The comprehensive type identifies high-level risks and assesses them in
terms of probability and severity.
• The detailed level analysis assesses production processes on a detailed
level and identifies failure modes and their consequences.
• Emergency plans focus on the outcome of different types of poten-
tially catastrophic scenarios and establishes action plans about how they
should be dealt with.
Comprehensive risk analysis
Dialysers - Hechingen
The plant in Hechingen has made the most comprehensive work with busi-
ness risks. Risks are identified through a free brainstorming session with the
plant’s EHS (environment, health and safety) manager and the concerned area
manager (e.g. HR manager).
The risks are identified, given name and ID number and sorted into one
of four categories (Management & Organisation, Strategic & Market, Opera-
tional and Legal).
Possible causes of the risks are identified and evaluated in terms of prob-
ability of occurrence and impact on scales of four steps. The evaluation of
the risks, meaning the underlying assumptions and calculations in terms of
probability and occurrence, are kept rather short and are therefore easy to
overview. There is also room for suggestions of possible strategies of how the
risks should be implemented and other appropriate information.
The work process is done with support of specialised software which has
been used for around 10 years. The implementation of the process was done
together with consultants from the developer of the software that also helped
with defining categories and suitable scales for the occurrence and severity
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rating. The software also includes functions for presentation of the risks with
matrices and overview spreadsheets.
As of March 2013, Hechingen has 28 active risks (3 organisational, 4 strate-
gic and market, 1 financial, 19 operational, 1 legal).
Dialysers - Meyzieu
The manufacturing unit for dialysers in Meyzieu, France, uses 11 risk cate-
gories (raw material, product quality, production process, production equip-
ment, tools, supply, building/infrastructure, environment, market & customer,
people & organisation and other financial risk).
Within each of those categories, different risks have been identified and
given ratings in terms of severity and occurrence. Both scales have five de-
fined steps measured in financial impact (severity) and probability of yearly
occurrence. Each risk can also be accompanied by some remarks, but there
are no explanations of how the evaluations have been done. As an overview,
the risk categories are presented in a conventional risk matrix.
The documentation is done with a quite simple but for the task sufficient
Excel spreadsheet.
Meyzieu has currently identified 49 different risks with between twelve and
one risks in each of the 11 categories. Most risks are found in the production
processes and the supply of raw material.
Bloodlines - Prerov
The bloodlines manufacturing unit in Prerov, Czech Republic, has had two
risk analysis performed by their insurance companies where in the second
instance from 2010 an assessment of 10 risk categories has been done.
The areas (management, human element, security, construction, compart-
mentation, active protection, machinery breakdown, utilities, natural hazards
and industry risk standard) were assessed on a scale of four steps by the
insurance company’s representative.
The analysis is accompanied by a short description but no complete identi-
fication procedure has been followed and the risks in each category seem to be
aggregated into a mean value. The rest of the risk analysis is mainly focused
on fire risks and protection against them.
While this is certainly interesting and necessary, it does not by any means
give a complete oversight of all of the plant’s risks.
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Solutions – All sites
All plants in the Solutions business area (Daytona, Yongin, Drycart Lund and
Sondalo) have done a risk brainstorming following the same model.
The plants use eight different categories in the brainstorming (building,
equipment, personnel flow, material flow, regulatory/good manufacturing prac-
tice, captive products, unique production processes and single source suppli-
ers).
The risks are analysed on a one-dimensional scale of five steps, ranging
from low to high without giving individual scores to the likelihood and severity
of each risk.
At least in the case of Yongin, the risk identification has been done using
an overview process map and a list of raw materials and important equipments
used in the manufacturing.
Detailed level risk analysis
Solutions - Daytona
Apart form the high level comprehensive risk analysis done in Daytona, there
has also been made thorough studies of production processes using a FMEA
framework. The processes are assessed both on a high level evaluating large
production elements and common events and also on a more detailed level
where there has been quality events or complaint issues. (RM1-H, TSS Pro-
cess overview, Prisma Products; RM1-25-F, Kiefel bag manufacturing process,
prisma Products)
The risk analysis is primarily concerning product risks and patient safety
but for some identified risks there are also process impacts described in some
cases. An example of an identified process harm is the delay in bag manufac-
turing due to power interruptions.
In the FMEA the risks and their causes are analysed in severity, occurrence
and detectability and then multiplied resulting in a risk priority number, all
according to Gambro’s working instructions for Product Risk Management.
However, the ratings are with few exceptions only based on the product risks
identified, finding business risks has not been a primary objective of the anal-
ysis and there is no evaluation of the financial impacts that a disruption may
cause.
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Bloodlines - Italy
The bloodline manufacturing, now located in Poggio Rusco, has presented
detailed level HACCP analysis considering issues that could affect the patient
safety. The entire production flow has been analysed using an overview process
map for the production. Risks have been identified and critical control points
are found for all risks.
The risks are assessed in the same way as in the Daytona example (severity,
occurrence and detectability) and classified according to GWIN 12-01. As for
Daytona, the primary objective is not to find risks of financial burden to
Gambro.
The manufacturing unit has also presented an analysis for production is-
sues which has been resolved using root cause analysis with 5-why and cause-
and-effect diagrams. Quality issues which could potentially lead to disruption
of Gambro’s ability to deliver to have thus effectively been resolved.
Apart from those activities, Poggio Rusco has also been conducted an as-
sessment of disruption risks together with the site in Crevalcore in preparation
for the factory rebuild in Medolla. This work is further described in chapter
7.
Emergency Plans
Bloodlines - Shanghai
The documentation obtained regarding risk management at the bloodline
manufacturing in Shanghai is limited to regulations and procedures in the
case of emergencies, especially fires. While this documentation is necessary, it
does not take a holistic approach as how to identify and evaluate all risks. It
should be noted however, that the documentation is written in Chinese and
the translation from Google Translate may not have captured the text’s full
context.
Solutions – Sondalo
The production facility in Sondalo has done an assessment of potential dis-
ruptive scenarios. The analysis covers disruptions in the supply of water and
other utilities, the production process, the supply of raw materials and prob-
lems regarding the facility. While the analysis is presented in short terms in
PowerPoint format, it covers the essential parts of the plant. The risks are
not analysed in terms of severity or likelihood, which may make it difficult to
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prioritise and evaluate the proposed mitigation strategies. A more structured
form of presentation could address this issue.
Summary of Gambro’s approaches
From the information gathered it is clear that Gambro are used to working
with risk management on their different production facilities. The informa-
tion also imply that the current risk assessments are quite diverse throughout
Gambro, both between and within the stated categories. As an effect of the
regulatory requirements, the assessments are mainly considering product risks
and the risks of harming patients. Hechingen in Germany, Meyzieu in France
and all the Solutions factories have identified and analysed business risks, but
there is certainly room for harmonisation and improvement.
As the company, regardless of site, have established procedures for product
risks and wide experience of such risk assessments, they should be able to
expand the risk focus and consider business risks without too much struggle.
Using approaches similar to the methodologies currently used, such as FMEA,
will ease the transition for the sites affected.

Chapter 6
Model
This chapter proposes a risk management model for Gambro. It furthermore
motivates the model and its three major parts, the Business Impact Anal-
ysis, Risk Assessment and Risk Mitigation & Business Continuity Strategy
and proposes appropriate governance strategies and routines. The first stage,
the Business Impact Analysis, is where the direction and level of detail of the
analysis is set. Subsequently the Risk Assessment stage includes identifying,
analysing and evaluating risks, followed by the Risk Mitigation & Business
Continuity Strategy where appropriate pro-active and re-active action activi-
ties are proposed.
6.1 Sources of Model
The model is influenced by three major sources, namely the Gambro envi-
ronment, relevant literature and case benchmarks, all in accordance with the
constructive approach methodology chosen. This is shown in figure 6.1.
Model 
Proposed
Gambro
 Organisation & 
routines
Literature
New theory
Cases
Benchmarking
Figure 6.1: The sources of the proposed model
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Gambro
As many authors, such as Waters (2011) and Christopher and Peck (2004)
actually suggest that the organisation is the most important aspect to consider
when developing a risk agenda, Gambro’s current methods and organisation
was considered when developing the model. This includes the structure of
the organisation, i.e. responsible roles, geographic locations of the facilities
and the currently used risk management practices. This includes both the
current business interruption practices as well as the more extensive product
risk management.
Academic literature
Academic literature has laid the basis of the development of the model, de-
termining what aspects that are critical to the success and what activities
that are required. The model is furthermore deeply supported by the ISO-
standards of Risk Management and Business Continuity Management, ISO
31000 and ISO 22313 respectively. The purpose of this combination is to con-
sider both unknown and known risk scenarios to have appropriate pro-active
and re-active preparations ready.
Cases
The cases of Alfa Laval, Ericsson and Tetra Pak are used as both an inspiration
as well as a benchmark for the developed model.
6.2 Organisation
When developing an environment for risk management, it is first essential to
structure the organisation around it (Waters, 2011, p. 197). The current
organisation, the need for a global overview but also adequate expertise, are
the main incentives for the proposed level of governance.
• Global Process Continuity Manager (GPCM) – is responsible for the
risk management on a global level.
• Process Continuity Management Team (PCMT) – at each site a manage-
ment team is responsible for all risk management activities. Represen-
tatives for the production, information technology, facility and supply
make up the team. The GPCM supports the teams at all sites in their
tasks.
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• Continuity Project Team (CPT) – cross functional teams formed to per-
form detailed level risk evaluations. The PCMT is responsible for iden-
tifying and guiding the appropriate specialist for each evaluation.
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Management 
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Process Continuity 
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Process Continuity 
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Figure 6.2: Proposed governance model for Gambro
Global Process Continuity Manager
Leading Gambro’s risk management work is a Global Process Continuity Man-
ager, GPCM. This person has the overall view of all risk management projects
going on throughout the company and is also leading the training of staff in
risk management techniques.
Responsibilities:
• Monitoring which risks has been considered and what the sites are ready
to deal with.
• Communicate with top level management.
• Spread knowledge of methods and solutions between different sites.
• Responsible that risks are monitored.
• Develop the methods of risk management.
• Responsible that business continuity plans are harmonised and ready.
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• Determining appropriate redundancy levels.
The main objective for this role is making sure that the risk agenda is
aligned in a global perspective. As the theory chapter also suggest, this person
also has regular contact with top level management, making sure that the risk
management has necessary support, and setting appropriate redundancy levels
for the different risks.
Process Continuity Management Team
The GPCM together with representatives from the line organisation comprise
the Process Continuity Management Team at each site. Representatives from
the following functions are regarded as necessary to get a complete view of
the sites’ risk environment:
• The production is the core process which this part of Gambro’s risk man-
agement revolves around, the involvement of this function is therefore
obvious.
• IT support is vital in many of the production processes and a complete
oversight of risks to those systems is therefore necessary.
• The buildings and utilities such as electricity, water etc are also vital
to most operations and have also a large exposure to different types of
threats, the involvement of persons with insight in those matters is also
necessary at this level. (Överstyrelsen för civil beredskap, 1999, p. 52)
• The supply of components and raw materials is of course vital for the
output of products. This function should thus be represented in the
management team.
In matters where necessary, persons with different expertises e.g. regula-
tory affairs, legal questions or EHS (Environment, Health and Safety) should
be consulted by the PCMT.
As the PCMT responsibilities include identifying critical activities and
resources, the members should be experienced individuals with a complete
overview of their respective functions and how they relate to the extended
organisation (this task is further described later in this chapter). They should
furthermore be on a site management level as they need access to relevant
information as well as have the authority to priority the site’s activities (Wa-
ters, 2011, p. 80). The involvement of the GPCM in the team also keeps the
process harmonised throughout Gambro.
Responsibilities of the Process Continuity Management Team:
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• Identify critical processes which require further assessment.
• Evaluate the business value of the critical processes in terms of potential
lost sales.
• Collect and develop ideas of how to mitigate risks.
• Taking into account the overall effect on Gambro of their respective
process risks.
Continuity Project Teams
Appointed by the PCMT are Continuity Project Teams who are temporary
cross-functional teams with necessary expertise for the detailed work in each
process assessment. The composition of the groups varies from time to time. It
is however clear that most Continuity Project Teams include several different
functions. Their responsibilities can be summarised as:
• Identifying risk scenarios to specific critical resources or activities.
• Identifying risk root causes at specific critical resources or activities.
• Evaluating the risk in terms of likelihood and severity.
• Propose possible mitigation strategies.
In the event that the PCMT decides that the need for specific experts’
input is not necessary to make the complete risk analysis, the CPT is simply
not formed and the PCMT takes over its responsibilities.
6.3 Procedure
Managing a large set of risks to an organisation may seem as a daunting task
difficult to succeed with. However, by breaking down the each problem into
smaller pieces and brainstorming around them it is easier to identify where
the critical points are located and how threats to them should be looked upon.
This approach is consistent throughout the suggested procedure.
The work stream is divided into three major steps discussed below, namely
Business Impact Analysis, Risk Assessment and Business Continuity Strategy
& Risk Mitigation. Note that all steps are performed on site level, meaning
that the GPCM only acts in a managing role. He or she does not have any
specific work tasks in the suggested model, other than those mentioned above.
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1. Business Impact
Analysis
2. Risk Assessment
3. Risk Mitigation &
Business Continuity
Strategy
4. Excercise &
Monitoring
Site Management level Specialist level All site levels
 Identification of 
critical activities and 
resources in all parts 
of the plant.
 Decision of Recovery 
Time Objectives 
(RTOs) for all 
identified activities 
and reosurces
 Identify failure causes 
at critical activities 
and resources
 Determine severity 
and likelihood of all 
causes
 Risk mapping and 
prioritisation
 Determine risk 
mitigation strategies
 Establish Business 
Continuity Plans
 Measurement 
 Review and update
 Incident handling
 Training
Site Management level
Figure 6.3: Overview of the model proposed
The steps are furthermore inspired by the ISO-standards Risk Manage-
ment and Business Continuity Planning. (International Standard Organisa-
tion, 2009, 2013, 2012)
Some characteristics of the procedure are described below:
• Focusing on the critical activities and resources, in contrast of focusing
on all.
• Using both inductive and deductive approaches in the Business Impact
Analysis, identifying critical activities and resources as well as risk sce-
narios that should be further investigated.
• Using both inductive and deductive approaches in the Risk Assessment,
to support the process and maximise the risk coverage.
• An approach similar to FMEA is used, as the method suits well and is
known from Gambro’s current risk toolbox.
• Recurrent risks are listed to support the identification process.
• Using the business recovery time and business interruption value as a
financial estimation of the severity of a risk consequence.
• Both mitigating risk pro-actively, as well as planning activities to min-
imise the consequences of risks.
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Business Impact Analysis
The Business Impact Analysis (BIA) is about pinpointing activities and re-
sources where the risk management work should be focused, i.e. activities and
resources that are directly linked to Gambro’s ability to deliver and therefore
critical to Gambro’s capability to manage disruptive events. Subsequently the
BIA involves setting timeframes of when the activities need to be resumed,
setting the levels of requirements of the assessments. Furthermore the BIA
also involves identification of overall risks that cannot be attributed a specific
cause.
Scope of identification
When identifying risks, the PCMT have to decide the level of their analysis.
Preferably, both risks to the entire plant and to smaller parts should be cap-
tured. To succeed with this task, a top-down perspective should be taken, by
starting with overview risks and continuing with more detailed ones.
The idea can be presented by a set of maps, all with different scales.
First, a map of the plant’s country can be pictured, seeing the plant as a
critical resource in itself. Next, a map of the plant, showing its individual
sections could be pictured to identify the most important parts. Finally, using
a detailed level map showing all equipment in each section completes the
analysis.
The thought pattern allows for both high, medium and detailed level risks
to be identified and makes the identification process easier to structure.
Inductive and deductive thinking
The risk identification may be done both deductively and inductively. If a
deductive approach is used, an undesired scenario is pictured and (if possible)
its causes are assessed (e.g. how may all communication lines within the plant
break). An inductive approach means that individual parts of the plants are
assessed and the consequences of a disruption in that part are assessed. Prefer-
ably, both methods are used in parallel during the business impact analysis.
Focus on critical activities and resources
Critical activities and resources are those that cannot be re-established or re-
covered in an easy manner and consequently imply a higher recovery cost. For
instance, certain simple assembly processes can be re-established on another
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location quite easily whereas complex manufacturing processes with high re-
quirements of equipment and facilities are more difficult to start up if compro-
mised. The idea of covering only critical activities and resources as opposed
to all activities and resources is an important aspect. This enables the risk
organisation to focus and prioritise what is important, and postpone or ne-
glect what is not as important. Clear prioritisations are seen as essential,
and will have a direct implication on how the organisation deals with process
continuity. (Khan and Zsidisin, 2012, p. 192)
Some tools for identification of critical resources and activities are shown
in table 6.1.
The next step is to assign the scenario a Recovery Time Objective (RTO)
where RTO is the time the PCMT estimates can pass before Gambro’s ability
to deliver is affected, and consequently negative business impact will occur.
This is a managerial decision which is affected by for instance the risk accep-
tance level, safety stocks and the impact the disrupted product mix has on
Gambro’s business performance.
Checklist of risk categories
Some of the typical categories of disruption are shown in table 6.2. These
can be used in BIA as a support for identifying critical activities, resources or
scenarios, or in the following step, Risk Assessment, for identifying risks.
Risk Area Type of material that may be used
Production By using a detailed process map a complete overview
of the production is obtained. All operations can and
should probably not be extensively worked on in a
risk perspective; therefore the goal of the first step
is to identify those that are critical to the operations
of the plant.
Facility Maps of the facilities, electrical and water system, etc
as well as insurance reports can be used to localise
the critical resources.
IT IT may use process maps and hierarchical maps, e.g.
Server – OP – Database – Application.
Supply Supply may use lists of key supplier and materials.
Table 6.1: Appropriate material for identification of critical activities and
resources
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Production IT Facility Supply
-Tool breakdown
-Machine breakdown
-Loss of know-how
-Severe employee
absence
-Strike
-Chemicals
-Legal obligations
-Human errors
-Loss of information
input
-Loss of internal data
network
-Loss of external data
network
-Loss of telephone
-Hardware failure
-Software failure
-Cooling failure
-IT-sabotage
-Servers failure
-Operating systems
failure
-Databases failure
-Applications failure
-Fire
-Flooding
-Other natural disasters
-Electricity supply
failure
-Water supply failure
-Waste handling
-Sabotage
-Theft
-Building maintenance
failure
-Failure of maintenance
of lifts, doors etc
-Road access failure
-Leakages
-Heating/Cooling
Failure
-No delivery because of
supplier
-No delivery because of
Gambro
-Severe sudden quality
problems
-(Financial problems at
supplier)
-(Operational problems
at supplier)
-(Logistical problems
from supplier)
Table 6.2: Typical categories of disruption
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Forming of Continuity Project Teams
For each process or resource identified in the Business Impact Analysis, in
which the PCMT does not have adequate expertise, the responsible mem-
ber forms a cross functional team and calls the initial meeting. This team
analyse the resource or process (Risk Assessment)and should be constituted
by individuals with as much detailed level knowledge of the process as possi-
ble. In production, the production manager responsible for the workstation or
machine is most certainly a group member. Other possible contributors are:
• The purchasing agent responsible for the material that is used in the
work station.
• A maintenance specialist with knowledge about the machine used in the
operations.
• An IT-specialist with knowledge about which information flow is in-
volved in the process.
These are just examples and it should not be predetermined who is in-
cluded in this group. The risk management team should be knowledgeable
enough to be able to assess this from time to time.
Outcome
The outcome of the Business Impact Analysis is a list of identified scenar-
ios, activities and resources that are deemed critical and should be further
considered. They should be documented and refer or include the following
information:
• Short description of resource.
• What departments that are concerned.
• The recovery time objective, i.e. the time in which Gambro aims to
recover the resource or process.
• Responsible for the subsequent risk assessment, defined as the Continu-
ity Project Team.
The completion is supported by a template, shown in figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Completed business impact analysis
Risk Assessment
The second step of the analysis typically executed by the Continuity Project
Team, which has the ability to analyse each activity and resource regarded
critical. Risk Assessment is as mentioned in the theory chapter, typically built
by three different steps: risk identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation.
The Continuity Project Team performs the two first steps and normally leave
the last step to the PCMT.
Task 1 – Identify potential risks and their causes
There are as mentioned two major approaches for Risk Identification, the de-
ductive and the inductive. They are preferably used in parallel, as it minimises
the risk of overlooking relevant information. The input to the work is the list
prepared by the PCMT as shown in figure 6.4.
First an inductive approach is used, by employing a framework similar to
FMEA. It involves going through subcomponents and brainstorm potential
failures implicated by that component. It is important that this is done in
a structured way, component by component, in order not to overlook any
failure modes. All potential causes of a failure mode should be considered and
documented. Preferably, causes are given descriptive names in order to avoid
falling into patterns of using the same causes for all risks.
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Second, the group should also consider overall failure modes in the process
which cannot be attributed to any specific sub-process, but rather hits the
process as a whole. For instance, a sensitive machine could be made unavail-
able by a minor flooding, caused by internal or external factors. Regardless of
the cause, the result and corresponding actions are the same. Those scenarios
can be difficult to capture when going through components of a given system
but should nonetheless be considered by this group. If necessary, the group
can use fault tree analysis to complement a more unstructured brainstorming
approach.
For each failure mode, the group should consider an expected business
recovery time (BRT). It is defined as the time during which no output can be
expected from the process in question.
This time consists of two components, the total down time and the buffer
time illustrated in figure 6.5.
Buffer time Business Recovery Time
Total down time
Figure 6.5: The components of the business recovery time and their relation
Finding the business recovery time can thus for instance be done by evalu-
ating each of the two times and then find the difference. When no buffer time
is expected, the BRT and the total down time are simply equal.
Task 2 – Evaluate likelihood
The second task of the group is to determine the likelihood of the event to
occur, which is connected to the specific risk source of the event. As the kind
of events that the model aims at capturing occurs very seldom this step relies
heavily on experts’ opinions and subjective matters. In order to standardise
and improve the quality of the subjective assessment as far as possible, a
checklist of questions has to be gone through and answered to the best possible
degree.
The classifications of the likelihood ratings, described in table 6.3 are
adapted from the currently used likelihood ratings in Hechingen and Meyzieu
with the difference that it is defined as years between occurrences instead
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Description Likelihood
Improbable More than 20 years
Remote Every 5-20 years
Occasional Every 1-5 years
Probable Every 0-1 year
Table 6.3: Proposed likelihood ratings (years between occurrences)
of likelihood per year. Using the expected number of years between occur-
rences is, in the authors view, more intuitive than assigning percentages of
the likelihood of yearly occurrence.
Task 3 – Evaluate Business Interruption Value
A third task is to determine the business value of the process. A failure of a
critical process whose downtime extends the buffer time leads to a loss of sales.
It is therefore possible to calculate how much profit is lost while the process is
not working properly. The advantage with this multi-stage procedure is being
able to break down the severity, making it easier to estimate.
The business value can thus be determined by the intuitive multiplication
of the products’ net margin and the expected number of produced units dur-
ing the Business Recovery Time. This gives the lost profit because of the
failure. In addition to this, other cost associated to the lack of delivery should
be considered, such as governmental fines and loss of goodwill.BRT = Total downtime− Buffer timeBIV = (BRT · Net margin) + additional costs
In the cases where a process’ output is needed for a subsequent or parallel
process, also that value should be considered. A difficulty with assessing
the BIV is the chain reaction caused by a disruption. As a disruption could
potentially hinder a semi-finalised product to get delivered to another site, it
is essential to take those effects into account. For that, representatives from
the global supply organisation should be consulted during this step.
To reflect the correct value of a process for Gambro, it is the financial
transaction from which the process origins from that should be considered. If
a disruption occurs in the first of several sub processes, illustrated to the left
in figure 6.6, it is the value of the finished product affected that should be
considered, not the value of a semi-finished product or a sub component.
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CustomerFinished productSub-components
Internal valueInternal value
Value to consider
Profit margin
Figure 6.6: Business interruption value in a supply chain perspective
As for non-production processes, it could be less straightforward to deter-
mine the direct value of a critical process. For instance, an IT process might
serve different parts of the production and could strike at different levels at
the same time. Even though it might be difficult, the PCMT should evaluate
which products that can not be delivered because of the failure and determine
a value in a similar fashion as otherwise.
To support the calculation of the Business Interruption Value, some ques-
tions and guidelines are presented in appendix A. The result should be pre-
sented in a FMEA based framework as shown in figure 6.8 and 6.7. The project
group can also in this stage provide some additional information which may
be of value in the continued risk assessment, and that the Continuity Project
Team may have additional knowledge of. Some examples of this can include:
• Possible mitigation strategies to decrease the expected likelihood
• Expected improvements in likelihood or BRT with implemented mitiga-
tion strategies.
• The possibility to run the process on reduced speed during parts or all
of the down time.
The Business Interruption Values are then divided into one of four cat-
egories, as shown in table 6.4. The classifications of BIV are also adapted
from the sites in Hechingen and Meyzieu, but should be scaled to fit the
site that is investigated. The scaling can for instance be done based on the
site’s turnover. One could argue that the same classifications should be used
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Description Value (MEUR)
Minor 0-0.1
Serious 0.1-1
Critical 1-15
Catastrophic >15
Table 6.4: Proposed severity ratings (in million euro)
throughout Gambro and that loss of sales means as much for Gambro wher-
ever its cause occurs. However, with the same classification used globally, the
resolution of the analysis at the smaller sized plants is decreased, making the
prioritisation more difficult.
A global classification for all sites is therefore proposed when the sites are
compared on a global level, whereas a local classification should be preferred
when risks are compared within a site. The BIV classification should also
be accompanied by a motivation expressed in monetary terms making the
conversion straight forward.
Presentation of Risk Analysis
The output of the second step is a list of possible (process and sub process)
failure modes together with their expected business interruption value, ex-
pected occurrence rate and some additional information, all completed in a
template. Each cause is assigned a Risk Priority Number (RPN) defined as
the risk’s distance from origo in a quadratic matrix with side’s of length four.
RPN =
√
(likelihood rating)2 + (BIV rating)2
Risk Priority Number
In order to make the risk analysis more presentable to management the tem-
plate from the Business Impact Analysis can be used again. The expected
downtime, severity and likelihood rating from the risk cause which gives the
highest RPN is transferred to the template. This is done to get an overview of
which part of the site is most vulnerable to risks and to have a more effective
presentation tool to management.
All risks are also shown in matrices, one for each part of the plant. This
gives management an intuitive tool to assess and prioritise which risk to mit-
igate.
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Figure 6.7: Completed risk analysis template part 1
Figure 6.8: Completed risk analysis template part 2
Figure 6.9: Completed risk assessment template
Risk Mitigation & Business Continuity Strategy
The third step is normally done by the Process Continuity Management Team,
and involves developing ways to mitigate the identified risks as well as coming
up with continuity plans for the more unknown scenarios.
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Figure 6.10: Matrix that provides an overview of the highest risks
Risk Mitigation
The Risk Mitigation step is about mitigating or treating the identified risks.
The risks can be mitigated in terms of likelihood and/or severity. As men-
tioned in the theory chapter the mitigation strategies typically fall into any
of the following categories; accept, share, transfer, reduce and avoid. The
case descriptions in chapter 4 can be used for inspirational purposes. The
mitigation strategy should be filled in the templates provided.
For instance Ericsson and Alfa Laval reason that likelihood is difficult to
assess and focuses their mitigation measures on lowering the potential impact
of a risk. Given the definition of Business Interruption Value, there are several
ways to go about with this strategy. Recall the definition as:BRT = Total downtime− Buffer timeBIV = (BRT · Net margin) + additional costs
The total downtime may be lowered by for instance:
• Improving the process knowledge.
• Investing in spare parts.
• Implementing continuous control systems, for instance according to HACCP
The buffer time can be raised by for instance:
• Raising stock levels of finishes goods, by consulting Global Supply.
• Investing in emergency capacity (for instance power generators).
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The additional costs can be lowered by for instance:
• Improving customer relations to avoid lost sales in the case of backlog-
ging.
• Flexible and multi-competent work force.
• Enable repair/extraction of expensive equipment/goods.
Business Continuity Strategy
By considering the key resources or activities whose complete scenarios are
unknown instead of known, a Business Continuity Plan should be developed.
The Business Continuity Plan includes the appropriate actions to resume ac-
tivities within agreed timeframes, by combining information from BIA and
RA. Furthermore it is divided into three different parts:
1. Response plan: the required reaction to an incident or emergency to
assess the level of containment and to control the activity.
2. Recovery plan: the actions that are needed to resume critical or essential
business operations, functions or processes.
3. Restoration plan: the planning for and implementing full-scale business
operations again and to allow the organization to return to normal ser-
vice level.
Outcome
Both the outcome of the Risk Mitigation as well as the Business Continuity
Strategy should be documented in their respective template together with re-
sponsible individuals and risk identification numbers. Examples are attached
in appendix 2.
Chapter 7
Test of Model
In order to evaluate and improve the model proposed in last chapter and to
get valuable inputs, a test of the model has been conducted at one site. With
the experiences from the earthquake and the upcoming reconstruction, the
planned site in Medolla was chosen for the pilot study.
After the earthquake events, the different units of the Medolla facility were
either moved to interim sites or outsourced. The monitor and bloodline manu-
facturing were moved to closely situated Crevalcore and Poggio Rusco whereas
the distribution centre was outsourced to Varese in the north of Italy. Admin-
istration and sales departments moved to Bologna. The interim sites were,
as the name suggest, just temporary and a new site in Medolla is currently
(spring 2013) under construction. Production is planned to be re-started dur-
ing 2014.
In Medolla, some brainstorming sessions had been done prior to the start
of this thesis project, with the aim of planning the new site’s layout with a
risk perspective in mind. Another reason was to acquire a complete view of
the risks before restarting the production in the new facilities. Therefore, the
test of the model developed in this thesis is based on those assessments.
7.1 Business Impact Analysis
A team involving individuals from the Production, IT, Building/Facility, QA/RA,
Communication and HR departments were gathered to perform vulnerability
workshops on the site in general, monitor and bloodline manufacturing and
distribution centre. Based on the earthquake experiences, the team brain-
stormed vulnerable resources and activities by answering the following ques-
tions.
81
82 CHAPTER 7. TEST OF MODEL
• What would be the effect if some specific event happens (external/internal)?
• What could cause this undesired event to happen?
• What was difficult to recover after the earthquake (tools, machines etc)?
That is to say deductive and inductive approaches for risk identification
were used together. Layout drawings of both the planned and the old site were
used during the brainstorming. The respective workshops’ outcome in terms
of business impact analysis are summarised in the attached tables (Appendix
3) and as an example the risks of the bloodline factory are shown in figure 7.1
Figure 7.1: The business impact analysis from the test of the bloodlines pro-
duction in Medolla, Italy
The risk identified concerns resources, which are both critical to the busi-
ness and hard to replace or recover.
By consulting Global Supply, an approximation of the stock levels of the
product-mix affected by the risks can be done. In this analysis, the Recov-
ery Time Objective is set equal to the time this stock level will cover. This
procedure is not in complete accordance with the model, preferably the RTO
is seen as a management decision based on the product mix importance and
stock levels is used as a possible mitigation strategy instead. However, the
difference does not have any significant impact on the results.
7.2 Risk Assessment
Causes
For every specific risk, potential disruption causes were identified. Earth-
quakes, fires, flooding and extreme weather were considered as causes of all
risks as they had all occurred before. The earthquake in 2012 was the first in
600 years, but the experience had made the risk considerably more apparent.
Fire has always been seen as a considerable risk and as heavy rain is frequent
in the area also flooding and other damages from extreme weather conditions
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were also relevant causes. In addition to those, social and political aspects
were present in the discussions regarding certain risks.
In the reconstruction of the plant, the main goal of the risk assessment
is to avoid making mistakes in the design and layout of the plant. If risks
can be avoided by clever architectural solutions, the cost of risk minimisation
will be kept as low as possible. Therefore the causes are limited to larger
disruptive events rather than going in-depth on production processes. That
type of analysis is better suited to a plant with well-established processes
where greater level of detail can be used when deciding mitigation strategies.
Expected downtime and Recovery Time Objective
For each of the risk causes, the expected downtime was set in relation to how
difficult it would be to recover or resume the specific activity or resource.
For instance, the bloodlines production in Poggio Rusco is highly automated.
Consequently, this was making the downtime easier to estimate as it often
involves getting a new machine or tool from the market. Another possible
scenario to resume the activity is to repair or outsource the disrupted resource.
As mentioned, the Recovery Time Objective is set to equal the buffer time
for risks affecting a specific product mix in this analysis. An approximation of
the number of weeks of stock can be used, a figure which is obtained from the
Global Supply department, who has updated information of all stock levels.
For risks where the product mix affected is too large to make a valid approx-
imation, the RTO is approximated as the product with the lowest weeks of
stocks available.
Business Interruption Value
The BIV-ratings was one of the most difficult things to calculate during the
risk assessments, but was generally built of three components:
1. The BRT, i.e. the expected downtime minus the possible buffer time.
2. The product mix affected by the disruption.
3. The profit margin of each affected product.
Of the three, the first is the most difficult to estimate. Machine suppliers,
facility maintenance companies and repair experts were consulted to obtain
estimates of repair and procurement lead times. The product mix affected is
rather straightforward and is easy to obtain.
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The profit margin of the affected products is obtained by subtracting the
Total Manufacturing Cost (TMC) from the Average Sales Price (ASP) for
each product. Examples of the calculations with made-up numbers are shown
in table 7.1 and 7.2.
In table 7.1, the calculation of the weekly profit margin for the monitor
manufacturing is performed by simply taking the profit margin of each unit
and multiplying it with the weekly demand. If the process affects both Artiset
Evosystem and Phoenix, the Business Interruption Value of the process is 5.8
+ 14.4 = 20.2 per week.
Table 7.2 shows how the weekly profit is calculated for the bloodlines
manufacturing. The total number of units produced (both Artiset and Ar-
tiset Ultra) each week was given. As no information of each product’s specific
quantity was given, they were assigned a ratio of the total production volume
(16.7 and 8.3 in the tables).
Process profit/week= w1(ASP1 − TMC1) + w2(ASP2 − TMC2) + . . . +
wi(ASPi − TMCi)
Where wi is product i‘s share of the total production rate (25 in the ex-
ample of table 7.2), ASP is the average sales price and TMC is the total
manufacturing costs.
Preferably the calculation should be done in a similar way regardless of
what products that are investigated. But as two different approaches needed
to be used on the same site, it shows that the calculations may differ and need
to be adjusted to fit the situation. It is however essential that the calculation
reflects the real profit that would be lost due to a disruption.
Artis Evosystem Phoenix
Units/year 10 15
TMC/unit 50 50
ASP/unit 80 100
Profit/unit 30 50
Process Profit/week 5.8 14.4
Table 7.1: An example of the Business Interruption Value calculation for the
Monitor production
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Artiset Artiset Ultra
Unit share 66.7% 33.3%
Units/week 16.7 8.3
TMC/unit 1 2
ASP/unit 5 5
Profit/unit 4 3
Process Profit/week 66.7 25.0
Table 7.2: An example of the Business Interruption Value calculation for the
Bloodline production. In the calculation a total production per week for the
process is estimated as 25 units
Likelihood
In the test, the risk causes are mainly external threats such as earthquakes,
extreme weather conditions and fires. The likelihood rating for these types
of events is naturally difficult to assess quantitatively and is done to the best
judgement of the stakeholders with some aid from historical data.
Proposals of measures for improvement
As the aim of the project was to plan the new layout there were numerous
proposals and mitigation strategies how the layout could be improved. The
proposals were deeply affected by the experiences of the earthquake as well as
the difficulties with the recovery. The proposals were furthermore all inspired
of five principles developed during the workshops:
• Accessibility to assets (equipment, tools etc)
• Visibility (physical)
• Robustness (physical)
• Separation (assets)
• Mobility (make unique, critical assets possible to move)
For instance, a proposed measurement was having extra electric trans-
formers to reduce the likelihood of having no power supply. Another example
was moving critical tools close to exits in order to get them out as quickly as
possible, reducing the impact of a possible fire or earthquake. The completed
template is attached (Appendix 3) for further review.
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7.3 Business Continuity Strategy and Mitigation
The relevant proposals from the previous step were inserted into the templates
together with their costs and benefits in terms of risk reduction. Business
continuity plans were also completed for the most serious risks as the model
proposes.
7.4 Difficulties During the Test
The model includes assumptions and there are as a consequence difficulties
in the procedures. The main difficulties that were experienced are listed below:
Causes to the risks.
• Hard to know how many and what causes that should be investigated
further.
Downtime estimation.
• Not always easy to estimate how to recover the activities and resources,
and how long time that would take.
Recovery Time Objective
• Recovery Time Objective is a management decision of when a disrup-
tion’s effects are too large and consequently a subjective matter.
Business Interruption Value.
• May not always affect a value easy to connect to, e.g. paper archives.
• Is not easy to see exactly how a resource affects the whole supply chain.
• The profit margin is considered sensitive material and can therefore be
hard to acquire.
Likelihood rating
• The likelihood of natural disasters is difficult to assess but external
providers can provide access to databases of the most common hazards.
Examples of companies that offer this service are Eqecat, MunichRe
and Perils. For internal facility risks, the site’s insurance company may
be a useful resource. For equipment specific risk causes, the supplier
can be consulted. For earthquakes, data from the national seismological
institutes can be used as support.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The first part of this chapter summarises the model briefly and the strong and
weak points of the model are discussed. It can be read independently for a
quick review of the model. Thereafter, an evaluation of the test of the model
is presented together with recommendations of how Gambro could precede to
implement the model throughout the company. Lastly, a discussion on the
future in this field is presented. The current trends and additional interesting
topics of research are touched upon.
8.1 Model Summary
The first goal of this project is to develop a model for managing disruptive
risks to Gambro’s operations. The proposed model is based on two main
features:
• Breaking down of problems in smaller and smaller pieces in order to find
root causes of risks.
• An iterative working method where similar approaches are used to assess
risks as thoroughly and systematic as possible.
The governance of the model is based on Gambro’s current organisation
where different manufacturing sites work rather independently. Knowledge
transfer should take place to keep process harmonised and avoid unnecessary
double work.
One Global Process Continuity Manager is responsible for overseeing
the activities on all sites from a corporate level’s point of view. Transferring
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knowledge between sites, harmonised processes and communication to top
level management are examples of the position’s responsibilities.
At each site, a Process Continuity Management Team is responsible
for the activities to be performed. The team performs the Business Impact
Analysis, a task that identifies critical resources and activities and establishes
Recovery Time Objectives for the resources and activities found. The iden-
tification is made for each part of a site (e.g. production facility, warehouse
and the site in general) considering the functions Production, IT, Facility and
Supply.
For each of the risks that require experts’ knowledge, aContinuity project
Team is formed. This team is put together cross-functionally with necessary
individuals from different departments. The team’s responsibility is to per-
form a complete Risk Assessment, meaning to identify potential causes for
an identified risk to occur and then evaluate its likelihood and business in-
terruption value. The team should also propose possible mitigation strategies
and views of what a business continuity plan could consist of.
Once the Risk Assessments have been completed, the risks are mapped
and the PCMT should evaluate which risks should be prioritised to mitigate
and which risks that can be accepted. The first task is to establish mitiga-
tion strategies, meaning activities to perform proactively to decrease the
likelihood or severity of the risk. The second task is to establish business
continuity plans, meaning action plans of what should be done if a specific
risk occurs.
Strengths and Challenges
Strengths
• The model allows Gambro to have a comprehensive and harmonised pro-
cedure for identifying and managing risks to their operations. By using
standardised templates, knowledge transfer is enabled and different sites
can learn from one another.
• Overview maps, process maps, drawings, component lists, etc are used
to identify critical resources and activities as well as risk causes. Those
tools give a systematic approach to avoid overlooking risks.
• The model also makes a point of distinguishing between the cause and
impact of a risk. This is important, as it allows management to assess
the risks clear sighted and aim the mitigation strategies correctly. To
8.1. MODEL SUMMARY 89
have many causes for each risk will in addition allow different likelihood
and severity evaluations for each cause, giving a better level of detail.
• By introducing the measurement Business Interruption Value, the fi-
nancial impact of the risks can be assessed and potential investments
be weighed against the risk of lost profit. Financial measurements are
effective communication tools which will aid the prioritisation process.
Challenges
• The first major drawback of the model is that there is no systematic
approach to address string consequences. If one major event causes other
seemingly unrelated problems to arise that may have been overlooked
in the business impact analysis. While mechanisms may cause grave
problems, they are very difficult to capture and the attention could
be drawn away attention from the issues which are easier to develop
strategies for.
• The proposed governance model uses the geographical divisions of world-
wide Gambro’s units. All tasks are done on the site level and address
the risks which appear there, while the global perspective is not as high-
lighted. This limit may hide opportunities for different sites to take over
responsibilities, and help one another, or worse hide how a disruptive
event at one site can affect others. As the model does not completely
cover this issue, a large responsibility lies on the GPCM who will have
to co-ordinate all activities with a global perspective in mind.
• The model also lacks in depth upstream in the supply chain, as implied
by the limitation of the thesis. While risk in the supply of components
and raw material should be addressed, there are no specific methods
of how to find information and evaluate suppliers further away than
the first tier. This is a complex and important topic, touched upon in
the theory chapter. While a first step is taken by this model, further
investigation in co-operation with strategic and operational purchasers
is necessary to fully address the problem.
• Another limitation of the thesis, and a weakness of the model, is the
lack of support for reviewing and monitoring the assessed risks. The
risk management process should never be seen as finished and there
must be established routines for updating the assessments periodically.
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• As with all risk management procedures, the model relies heavily on
experts’ approximations and subjective opinions. While this is certainly
a problem, it is one difficult to avoid when making any kind of forecast.
The problem has been addressed as far as possible by breaking down
problems into smaller pieces and using tools such as maps and checklists.
Contribution to theory
While risk analysis and supply chain risk has been widely addressed in aca-
demic literature during the last decade, this thesis contributes to theory by
offering a more practical take on the issues at hand. In academic literature,
we have identified a gap between the detailed level risk analysis tools and the
high level success factors for keeping organisations risk aware.
The methodology bridges this gap to some extent by including governance,
working methods and documentation templates. It is tailor made for Gambro,
but should be suitable to other organisations as well, with minor adjustments.
With the case studies contributing strongly to the model design it is well
aligned with practice.
8.2 Discussion of the Model Test
In the last chapter the testing of the model was the described in detail. Even
if the test was done to aid a plant’s layout planning and not at a site with
established processes, the model showed to be very useful and gave a lot of
insights about the risk environment at the site. The purpose of the test was
twofold:
• Getting inputs for adjustments to the model and assuring the applica-
bility.
• Acquiring an overview of the risk environment in order to plan the new
site with those aspects in mind.
Involvement of People
One thing that became apparent as soon as the testing began in Medolla
was the need for many departments’ involvement. Apart from knowledge-
able persons from production, IT and facility, Global Supply was needed to
acquire the buffer times for the different products and the Finance depart-
ment was needed to get the profit margins. The assessments proved to be
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quite time consuming and require the business unit’s full support. With quite
clear interfaces, it made sense to divide the assessments between the units,
e.g. bloodlines, monitors, DC and general site in order to be efficient when
performing the workshops. This was done differently than what was first pro-
posed when designing the process, but we are confident that this division make
the assessments easier to perform from an organizational view.
Difference in challenges between units
When performing the risk assessment, the analysis of the highly automated
bloodlines production showed to be the most intuitive. To calculate the busi-
ness interruption value, the downtime estimate is a major part of the analysis.
The streamlined process with automated processes step-by-step can be seen as
a quite binary process which is either 100 % or 0 % functioning. For processes
which are more flexible than the automated bloodlines production, the down-
time is more difficult to estimate, especially when the risk causes are large
external events. One example is the monitor production where more manual
labour is involved and production often can be maintained at reduced speed
even if a problem arises.
Another difference between the bloodlines and monitor production is the
customers’ expectation of delivery precision. This difference became appar-
ent when estimating the buffer time with Global Supply. The monitors are
normally substituted when their life time is over but the customers, typically
hospitals, can wait with the delivery a couple of weeks without and conse-
quences in most cases. The bloodline products are consumable goods which
are required to perform dialysis, delivery precision is therefore of much higher
importance for those products and the deliveries can not be delayed.
Captive products
With the same logic, the importance of considering captivity of products be-
came more apparent during the testing. If the delivery capability of a captive
product is lost, the loss of goodwill may be significantly larger than otherwise.
For instance, if a governmental healthcare institution has to change treatment
methods because of Gambro failing to deliver, the risk of losing the entire
market is considerable. In the case of Medolla all critical resources and ac-
tivities affect captive products, eliminating the need for different approaches
to captive and non-captive products. However, at sites where this is not the
case the difference should be taken into account when determining the recov-
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ery time objective, business interruption value and prioritisation of mitigation
investments.
Test summary
Even if a couple of issues and difficulties with the implementation were high-
lighted during the testing, it is important to remember that the test was
successful. The first purpose was to evaluate the model and second to give
valuable inputs for the site reconstruction, both targets were considered to be
fulfilled. The model was thoroughly tested and a considerably better overview
of the prevailing risks was acquired. Many of the already performed risk anal-
ysis at the different sites (described in chapter 5.3) shared many elements
to what the proposed model suggests and the transition should not be too
difficult. The model’s templates and ideas on business interruption value is
however considerably more structured. Seen in a bigger picture, the purpose
of the thesis is to harmonise and structure the sites’ risk management proce-
dures; only one test may not be enough to ensure complete applicability and
improvements should be added continuously throughout the implementation
and use.
8.3 Next Step
The risk management activities can never be seen as finished as the environ-
ment constantly changes. With the same argument the model can never be
seen as definitive and need further development as time goes.
The future activities can be divided into two major categories. The first
regards what Gambro should do to implement the proposed model within the
company, and the second regards what can be done to develop the model even
further.
Apart from the concrete model and other suggestions proposed in this
report, the project has hopefully contributed to Gambro by raising the aware-
ness of proper risk management at different levels. We hope that through the
interviews and conversations we have had throughout the last months, the
issues have come to mind, making the organisation more accepting to future
changes.
Implementation of the Model
During the time when this thesis was written, the model was tested on one site
out of 13, meaning that there is still work to be done in terms of carrying out
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the procedures as well as establishing the governance and routines throughout
Gambro. If the risk management are to be harmonised and coordinated for
all sites, which is the aim of the model, it is proposed that Gambro should
establish clear responsibilities as a first step.
Ideally, the risk management procedures would be integrated along the
whole supply chain. Of course that is a quite theoretical target, which is
generally not achieved in any supply chain. But as a first step, Gambro should
implement appropriate measures within, before moving the focus outside the
organisation’s borders.
Establish responsibilities
One idea is the proposed governance model that was discussed in chapter 6,
with a global coordinator (the Global Process Continuity Manager), different
site responsible (Process Continuity Management Team) and project groups
(Continuity Project Teams). The sites with comprehensive risk management
procedures (see chapter 5) also have procedures that can be used for inspi-
ration. One part of this step is making the model, its templates and records
available for the stakeholders within Gambro. This can be achieved with a so-
called e-room, which makes documentation, i.e. templates, instructions and
reports, available on the virtual network throughout Gambro. The e-room
solution also makes sharing similar solutions between sites easier.
Establish routines
Another decision to take is when and how often the procedures are to be up-
dated. The risk environment should be monitored and reviewed, both on a
site and a global level. Preferably, this should be done on a biannual or an-
nual basis by the GPCM together with the top-management and the PCMT
within the sites, but is particularly important when introducing new products,
processes, sites, suppliers etc. One solution would be to include risks in the
continuous reviews which are in place, and introduce KPIs for risk manage-
ment to stimulate the work. KPIs are however something that needs to be
implemented carefully and are not discussed in this thesis.
In addition, practice procedures of the established business continuity
plans needs to be introduced. If proper rehearsals are done regularly, the
initiation of the continuity plans is ensured if an undesired event would hap-
pen, just as fire drills are done as preparation for fire. These tests furthermore
highlight any weaknesses and problems with the plans, raise the awareness of
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the importance of a BCM and give Gambro confidence that crises can be
recovered.
Develop the model further
First when Gambro has established clear responsibilities and routines within
the company, the model can be further developed. The most natural way to
do it is expanding the risk management’s borders. As all members in a supply
chain are linked together, a risk for one supplier is deeply affecting other
members of the supply chain. The mechanism goes both up- and downstream,
a customer may face serious problems if a supplier suddenly quit its deliveries
and a supplier can get in equally deep trouble if a customer stops its orders.
Given this interdependency, an aligned risk management process is of interest
to both parties.
A possible action is to introduce a harmonised management system of
supplier risk throughout Gambro. The model proposed in this thesis can
be used as a basis for it, but in the future an expanded model is probably
going to be necessary. Introducing data driven models for risk identification
and assessment, allowing Gambro to make decisions based on facts rather
than opinions would stabilise the process. Access to information is the key
component, and one first step would be to invite critical suppliers to use a
similar risk analysis model as the one proposed and to share their results with
Gambro.
Information systems for widening the supply chain visibility
The technological advancements in search engines and internet technology
have opened new possibilities to perform risk analysis upstream of the supply
chain and it is now possible to extract data from a larger amount of sources
than in the past.
One such example is a new technology called Supplier InfoNet, developed
by SAP. The service scans through data and information from thousands of
sources including financial databases and newspaper articles. Information
about suppliers in different tiers of a company’s supply chain is thus made
available and possible sources of problems are identified. The service can
for instance help foreseeing delivery time problems if a supplier further up the
supply chain is experiencing problems. The interface share many features with
social networks and information about suppliers is only granted to those in
direct relationship with the concerned company. While this service is not yet
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available in all countries and business sectors, it is an interesting development
to keep an eye on for the future. (SAP, 2013)
Adapt model to other segments
If appropriate adaptations are taken, it is also possible to use the proposed
model on other area, such as market, legal, transportation and occupational
risks. The adaptations that are required are first and foremost in the risk
analysis, by changing the severity ratings to fit the intentions.
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Appendix A
Guidelines for Risk Analysis
A.1 Checklist for evaluation of cause likelihood
Production
• Has the risk cause occurred before?
• If yes, has anything been done about the cause?
• Are there any parallel systems which could take over the running of the
process in case of the failure?
• What (and how many) external systems is the resource or process de-
pending on? E.g. electricity, water, information system,
• Are all employees involved in the process properly trained?
• Is the resource/process of-the-shelf or customised to Gambro?
• What is the complexity level of the resource?
• What is the age of the resource?
• Has it been serviced properly?
• If spare parts are used, are they of the right quality?
IT
• Has the risk cause occurred before?
• If yes, has anything been done about the cause?
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• Are there any parallel systems which could take over the running of the
process in case of the failure?
• Are there warnings system built in to the process? E.g. Server over-
heating warning
• Can human mishandling make the risk occur?
• Can the risk occur as a result of changes in other processes? E.g updates
of databases affects the operating system
• Is the process/resource properly maintained?
• Is the maintenance very dependent on one person’s competence?
Facility
• Has the risk cause occurred before?
• If yes, has anything been done about the cause?
• Are there any parallel systems which could take over the running of the
process in case of the failure?
• Is the risk depending on external suppliers?
• Is the resource properly maintained?
• Is the cause depending on other root causes? E.g. Smoke in one part of
a facility accts a sensitive clean room through ventilation system
• Is the maintenance very dependent on one person’s competence?
• Is there compartmentation for fire protection?
• Are there any active fire protection measures implemented?
Supply
• Has the risk cause occurred before?
• If yes, has anything been done about the cause?
• Are there any parallel systems which could take over the running of the
process in case of the failure?
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• Is the material procured from one or several suppliers?
• Has the supplier undergone any organisational changes recently?
• What is the distance to the supplier?
• What is the minimum stock level of the component/material?
• Are other Gambro sites using the same component?
• Is the supplier close to maximum capacity?
*Those questions can be complemented with the supplier audit questionnaire
A.2 Checklist for evaluation of business
interruption value
1. Which is the product mix affected by the risk?
2. What is the Business Recovery Time? I.e. the time that Gambro will
not be able to deliver the affected product mix (weeks).
3. What is the weekly gross margin that is lost due to the disrupted resource
or process?
4. Is there any idle capacity labour or equipment due to the disruption?
5. s there an increase of inventory costs due to the disruption?
6. What are the costs of fixing the problem? (Repairs, alternate sourcing,
etc.)
7. Is goodwill loss an effect of the disruption?
The Business Interruption Value can be calculated by the intuitive multipli-
cation:
BIV = Business Recovery Time(2)·Weekly Gross Margin Lost(3)+Additional costs(4)(5)(6)(7)
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Template for Mitigation and Business Continuity Strategy Owner: Jim Conley 
Revision: 1.0 Approved by: Virginie Schwartz 
Effective Date: 2013-05-23 Page 1 of 4  
	  
Risk 2001 
Mitigation and Business Continuity Strategy  
 Release and Approval 
	  
Release and Approval by Continuity Project Team 
Department/Function Name Date and Signature 
Risk Analysis project (Master thesis) 
Emil Nilsson & Axel 
Hyllienmark 
2013-05-06	  
Global Process Continuity Manager ----- -----	  
Process Continuity Team Member ----- -----	  
Process Continuity Team Member -----	   -----	  
Process Continuity Team Member -----	   -----	  
Process Continuity Team Member -----	   -----	  
 
Executive Summary 
Mitigation plan for Risk 2001 in Medolla cassette manufacturing “Loss of dehumidification 
process”. 
 
The process is sensitive to fire and water damage and should be therefore  be located in a 
segregated area. 
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Description The dehumidification process is necessary for the manufacturing of article HD 
DN, SNDP, HDF and AFBK and is located in the bloodline manufacturing 
Responsible Alessandro Pecorari 
Department  
 
Mitigation of causes 
 
Earthquake 
BIV rating  
Likelihood rating  
Strategy Reduce 
Methods Segregated area 
 
*….. 
Responsible: 
Name 
Responsible: 
Name 
Total expense  
New BIV rating  
New likelihood rating  
 
 
2001 
 
Loss of dehumidification process 
 
Date: 2013-05-06 (creation) 
Date: (update) 
BIV rating  
Likelihood rating  
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Fire 
BIV rating  
Likelihood rating  
Strategy Reduce 
Methods Locate the process in a fire proof area 
 
*….. 
Responsible: 
Name 
Responsible: 
Name 
Total expense  
New BIV rating  
New likelihood rating  
	  
Business Continuity plan 
Responsible Name 
Department Name 
Created: 2013-05-06 
Last updated: 2013-05-06 
C
on
tin
ui
ty
 P
la
n 
Reponse Phase 
Order new machine from market ASAP 
Notify Global Supply of potential shortages of product C 
Recovery Phase 
Relocate production to site X. 
Outsource process to company X 
Restoration Phase E.g. Machine reparation, new machine purchase etc. 
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